“World Government,” pages 89-95
Industrial and agriculture societies need each other, just like the butcher and the baker need each other. So it would seem that doux commerce should reign – except that trade is now generally managed by governments: “…if the butcher is one sovereign State and the baker is another, if the number of loaves that the butcher can exchange for his joints depends upon his skill with the revolver, it is possible that the baker may cease to regard him with ardent affection [p. 89].” So economic interdependence, mediated not through the market but through nation-states, causes strife, not fellow-feeling. Politics is the master – and contra Marx, politics itself is not determined by economics. Marx did not understand that impoverishing others is more important to many people than enriching themselves.
The advantages of large size are most apparent in war, and war has served to expand social units, up to nations and combinations of nations. War used to offer profits to victors, but now it has become too expensive. (As a percentage of the population, war was often more costly in the past, when disease deaths are considered along with battle deaths.) “The population of Japan increased by about five millions during the Second World War, whereas it is estimated that during the Thirty Years’ War the population of Germany was halved [p. 91].” But the radioactivity of atomic weapons might wipe out all life on earth, though we can’t be sure until it is too late.
Ages when defensive forces have the upper hand over offensive forces tend to be happy ages. We have to worry that technological advance might give a considerable advantage to offense, perhaps through biological weapons. Modern wars also put more of the civilian population at risk, diminishing the attractiveness of urban life. “I am an old man, and I can remember a time when it was not thought quite the thing to make war on women and children; but that happy age is past [p. 92].”
All in all, war is more of a menace now than it has been in the past. The prevention of war, therefore, takes on paramount importance, and justifies thinking about massive political reforms. Simply continuing with our present nation-state system will, with high likelihood, bring what it has always brought, war. So a global sovereign power, one possessing a monopoly on the most lethal weapons, is required.
How would such a world authority work? Besides its monopoly control of advanced weaponry, it must command the loyalty of troops. Inter-national disputes must be submitted to its jurisdiction, and any unsanctioned military offensive will make the aggressor nation a pariah, and subject to armed retaliation from the global forces. Various judicial and legislative powers will evolve naturally in the wake of the requisite military authority.
The world government may well not be democratic, and it may be foisted on some nations unwillingly. [Russell made a similar point in Unpopular Essays.] Humanity is probably too politically immature to achieve world government in a wholly consensual manner. Over time, defeated powers can join the winning partnership. But for stability to reign, the great conflictual issues of race, population, and creed will have to be defused. “It will be impossible to feel that the world is in a satisfactory state until there is a certain degree of equality, and a certain acquiescence everywhere in the power of the world Government, and this will not be possible until the poorer nations of the world have become educated, modernized in their technique, and more or less stationary in population [pages 94-95].” Western progress in the past half-century shows that this pleasant prospect is not a pipedream.
The chain of logic leads to the conclusion that a stable global government can only exist if the major countries are not under population pressure. Today’s leading nations have reduced infant mortality, enlarged lifespans, and improved living standards. Their success provides a template for poorer nations. So the conclusion is one of hope: men at this time are masters of their fate. They possess the means to achieve a better world.
Sunday, June 2, 2013
Sunday, April 21, 2013
New Hopes for a Changing World, Chapter Ten
“Conflicts of Manners of Life,” pages 83-88
New techniques, like agriculture once was, always come into conflict with traditional ways of life, with wars the likely result. The people of the old ways, the nomads or barbarians, frequently possess superior military prowess. As a ruling minority, however, they tend to become assimilated into the ways of civilization. “Kublai Khan, although his grandfather had been a ruffianly barbarian, was a man of the highest culture, quite capable of stately pleasure domes and the rest of it [p. 84].” Even if a new technique such as agriculture is militarily inferior, its economic efficiency causes it to spread, so conquest by nomads does not lead to a proliferation of nomads.
In the past, a major problem for civilized communities was to maintain the warlike resolution necessary to keep the invaders at bay. The military advantage recently has shifted away from the nomads, though, and perhaps an optimistic view would hold that the atomic bomb helps to secure the rich, civilized portions of the globe.
Seafaring and land-based cultures also have been historical military rivals. The seafarers, whether Norsemen, Venetian, or British, often have had the upper hand. They, too, tend to evolve from pirates into merchants, while seafaring in general has spread civilization. Seafaring exposes one to the ways of other cultures, promoting a cosmopolitanism that helps to combat bigotry. Traders rely on mutually advantageous exchange, and so they develop the habit of looking at situations from the point of view of others. This civilizing feature of maritime trade is countered by the close relationship between the merchant marine and piracy, which allows sea power to inculcate imperialism. Voluntary trade can become coerced trade, as the Opium War demonstrates.
Today’s clash of techniques is between industrial production and traditional agriculture. In geopolitical terms, the clash pits Europe and the US against a Russian-led Asia. The agricultural workers in Russia, India, and China are barely at subsistence. Those who succumb to the siren song of communism will soon find police and spies weighing them down, instead of gaining the freedom that they seek. “And if the Soviet system is neither softened nor overthrown, they may suffer centuries of impoverished serfdom [p. 88].” Agricultural societies will eventually give way to industrialized societies – even agriculture is industrial in developed countries. We can hope that the current clash of industry and agriculture will not involve the long periods of strife that characterized the conflicts between nomads and agriculturalists, and between land-based and seafaring societies.
New techniques, like agriculture once was, always come into conflict with traditional ways of life, with wars the likely result. The people of the old ways, the nomads or barbarians, frequently possess superior military prowess. As a ruling minority, however, they tend to become assimilated into the ways of civilization. “Kublai Khan, although his grandfather had been a ruffianly barbarian, was a man of the highest culture, quite capable of stately pleasure domes and the rest of it [p. 84].” Even if a new technique such as agriculture is militarily inferior, its economic efficiency causes it to spread, so conquest by nomads does not lead to a proliferation of nomads.
In the past, a major problem for civilized communities was to maintain the warlike resolution necessary to keep the invaders at bay. The military advantage recently has shifted away from the nomads, though, and perhaps an optimistic view would hold that the atomic bomb helps to secure the rich, civilized portions of the globe.
Seafaring and land-based cultures also have been historical military rivals. The seafarers, whether Norsemen, Venetian, or British, often have had the upper hand. They, too, tend to evolve from pirates into merchants, while seafaring in general has spread civilization. Seafaring exposes one to the ways of other cultures, promoting a cosmopolitanism that helps to combat bigotry. Traders rely on mutually advantageous exchange, and so they develop the habit of looking at situations from the point of view of others. This civilizing feature of maritime trade is countered by the close relationship between the merchant marine and piracy, which allows sea power to inculcate imperialism. Voluntary trade can become coerced trade, as the Opium War demonstrates.
Today’s clash of techniques is between industrial production and traditional agriculture. In geopolitical terms, the clash pits Europe and the US against a Russian-led Asia. The agricultural workers in Russia, India, and China are barely at subsistence. Those who succumb to the siren song of communism will soon find police and spies weighing them down, instead of gaining the freedom that they seek. “And if the Soviet system is neither softened nor overthrown, they may suffer centuries of impoverished serfdom [p. 88].” Agricultural societies will eventually give way to industrialized societies – even agriculture is industrial in developed countries. We can hope that the current clash of industry and agriculture will not involve the long periods of strife that characterized the conflicts between nomads and agriculturalists, and between land-based and seafaring societies.
Sunday, April 7, 2013
New Hopes for a Changing World, Chapter Nine
“Law,” pages 74-82
Law is organized force, force transferred from individuals to larger groups. Civilization involves the renunciation of private uses of force, in favor of a state, rule-bound monopoly. These rules, the law, make some allowance for private force, as in self-defense, and typically give the strong and rich more scope to use force than the weak and poor.
The rules that constrain the powers of government to arrest and imprison, for instance, also show a similar tendency for some breaches to be admitted. In many nations, those breaches are legion. “But although in most countries at most times the rule of law is subject to limitations, it is, nevertheless, important, and governs a very large part of those human relations that are liable to give rise to disputes [p. 75].”
Law originated as the formalization of the rules decreed by the powerful – justice was not part of the mix. Though the unfairness of law past is hard to stomach today, it was necessary to incentivize the powerful to become rule bound. Bad law trumps no law, by and large, even though on occasion it is worth paying the steep price of revolution to move closer towards justice.
At some point law protects property, either the products of one’s labor or the lands of one’s conquering. But technical advance means that most products become the result of many people’s labor. As a result, modern property law is a confusing entanglement of ancient notions of property with modern production techniques. Much property law has no connection to traditional property, including those parts dealing with patents, copyrights, and corporations. Russell adopts a Marxian line: “Property, in fact, is what the dominant political group chooses that it should be [p. 78].”
Nonetheless, the law is valuable, in part by taking the individual (if not his or her class) largely out of the equation. In conflicts among social equals, it can be impartial, and some justice towards the lower classes will emerge in the service of reduced incentives for rebellion. Disagreements that might have been resolved by violence are resolved in a relatively bloodless fashion, and the habit of bloodletting declines. Custom has a significant hold over preferences and behavior, so the custom of non-violent dispute settlement – a custom that law is necessary to nurture – itself reduces the impulse towards violence. “Most civilized men abstain from murder, not by means of an iron self-control, but because the thought of murder never enters their heads [p. 79].”
Plato’s conception of justice amounts to circular reasoning, that it is just to give each man his just deserts. The tautology could be transformed into prescription if it were possible to independently determine of just what those just deserts consist! Contributions to society might be the standard, but who can compare these across occupations? In practice, conceptions of just deserts are usually aligned with power, though the spread of democratic ideals reduces the appeal of such a concordance. Equality is the main element of the democratic alternative, but deserving lurks in the background.
Indeed, it is widely accepted that particularly valuable social contributions merit reward, while costly criminal acts deserve punishment. (The extreme view that some hold, such as that the large fortunes of successful business people are fair recompense for their effort, is harder to maintain.) But connecting rewards and punishments to the social consequences of behavior is valuable, so full equality should not be the goal. Nothing is either good or bad, but its likely consequences make it so. “If crime could better be prevented by rewarding criminals than by punishing them, I should be in favor of rewarding them [p. 80].”
Russell offers up again a vision where criminals, though believed to be punished severely – indeed, in this telling, executed – are instead sent to live happily on a remote, gorgeous island. [RBR covered a slightly later retelling in Chapter VII of Human Society in Ethics and Politics.] This system preserves deterrence “without being vindictive [p. 81].” It would contribute to the happiness of criminals, and their happiness should be included in an assessment of social well-being. The sole problem is that the system is not sustainable, as the secret would get out.
Departures from equality, then, can be tolerated, if by doing so good consequences are likely to follow. But the world is not even close to this degree of equality – look at the discrimination against blacks, Jews, and women, for instance. Inheritance gives the children of the rich a leg up. These inequalities do not add to overall utility – indeed, they detract from it, in that they stoke resentment and unrest – so they should be redressed. “Every approach towards equality, other things being equal, promotes social stability, and social stability is the fundamental purpose of law [p. 81].”
This discussion now approaches the Marxian topic of class conflict. Marx’s analysis put class conflict at the center, and maintains, implausibly, that when the proletariat takes over the conflict magically vanishes. Marx’s vision and Marxian-style revolution are driven not by justice but by resentment and hatred, and out of these sources no lasting good can emerge. [Russell will later offer similar sentiments on Marx and Bolshevism in Portraits From Memory, in at least two places.] The habit of hatred will not disappear when the revolutionaries take over; in the Soviet case, the Bolsheviks re-targeted their hatred among themselves. “This illustrates the principle which Marxists are apt to forget, namely, that it matters not only what is done but why it is done, since all passions, good and bad alike, have a certain momentum and a tendency to self-perpetuation [p. 82].”
Law is organized force, force transferred from individuals to larger groups. Civilization involves the renunciation of private uses of force, in favor of a state, rule-bound monopoly. These rules, the law, make some allowance for private force, as in self-defense, and typically give the strong and rich more scope to use force than the weak and poor.
The rules that constrain the powers of government to arrest and imprison, for instance, also show a similar tendency for some breaches to be admitted. In many nations, those breaches are legion. “But although in most countries at most times the rule of law is subject to limitations, it is, nevertheless, important, and governs a very large part of those human relations that are liable to give rise to disputes [p. 75].”
Law originated as the formalization of the rules decreed by the powerful – justice was not part of the mix. Though the unfairness of law past is hard to stomach today, it was necessary to incentivize the powerful to become rule bound. Bad law trumps no law, by and large, even though on occasion it is worth paying the steep price of revolution to move closer towards justice.
At some point law protects property, either the products of one’s labor or the lands of one’s conquering. But technical advance means that most products become the result of many people’s labor. As a result, modern property law is a confusing entanglement of ancient notions of property with modern production techniques. Much property law has no connection to traditional property, including those parts dealing with patents, copyrights, and corporations. Russell adopts a Marxian line: “Property, in fact, is what the dominant political group chooses that it should be [p. 78].”
Nonetheless, the law is valuable, in part by taking the individual (if not his or her class) largely out of the equation. In conflicts among social equals, it can be impartial, and some justice towards the lower classes will emerge in the service of reduced incentives for rebellion. Disagreements that might have been resolved by violence are resolved in a relatively bloodless fashion, and the habit of bloodletting declines. Custom has a significant hold over preferences and behavior, so the custom of non-violent dispute settlement – a custom that law is necessary to nurture – itself reduces the impulse towards violence. “Most civilized men abstain from murder, not by means of an iron self-control, but because the thought of murder never enters their heads [p. 79].”
Plato’s conception of justice amounts to circular reasoning, that it is just to give each man his just deserts. The tautology could be transformed into prescription if it were possible to independently determine of just what those just deserts consist! Contributions to society might be the standard, but who can compare these across occupations? In practice, conceptions of just deserts are usually aligned with power, though the spread of democratic ideals reduces the appeal of such a concordance. Equality is the main element of the democratic alternative, but deserving lurks in the background.
Indeed, it is widely accepted that particularly valuable social contributions merit reward, while costly criminal acts deserve punishment. (The extreme view that some hold, such as that the large fortunes of successful business people are fair recompense for their effort, is harder to maintain.) But connecting rewards and punishments to the social consequences of behavior is valuable, so full equality should not be the goal. Nothing is either good or bad, but its likely consequences make it so. “If crime could better be prevented by rewarding criminals than by punishing them, I should be in favor of rewarding them [p. 80].”
Russell offers up again a vision where criminals, though believed to be punished severely – indeed, in this telling, executed – are instead sent to live happily on a remote, gorgeous island. [RBR covered a slightly later retelling in Chapter VII of Human Society in Ethics and Politics.] This system preserves deterrence “without being vindictive [p. 81].” It would contribute to the happiness of criminals, and their happiness should be included in an assessment of social well-being. The sole problem is that the system is not sustainable, as the secret would get out.
Departures from equality, then, can be tolerated, if by doing so good consequences are likely to follow. But the world is not even close to this degree of equality – look at the discrimination against blacks, Jews, and women, for instance. Inheritance gives the children of the rich a leg up. These inequalities do not add to overall utility – indeed, they detract from it, in that they stoke resentment and unrest – so they should be redressed. “Every approach towards equality, other things being equal, promotes social stability, and social stability is the fundamental purpose of law [p. 81].”
This discussion now approaches the Marxian topic of class conflict. Marx’s analysis put class conflict at the center, and maintains, implausibly, that when the proletariat takes over the conflict magically vanishes. Marx’s vision and Marxian-style revolution are driven not by justice but by resentment and hatred, and out of these sources no lasting good can emerge. [Russell will later offer similar sentiments on Marx and Bolshevism in Portraits From Memory, in at least two places.] The habit of hatred will not disappear when the revolutionaries take over; in the Soviet case, the Bolsheviks re-targeted their hatred among themselves. “This illustrates the principle which Marxists are apt to forget, namely, that it matters not only what is done but why it is done, since all passions, good and bad alike, have a certain momentum and a tendency to self-perpetuation [p. 82].”
Wednesday, March 20, 2013
New Hopes for a Changing World, Chapter Eight
“The Rule of Force,” pages 67-73
Humans can cooperate on an equal, voluntary basis, or greater force can compel submission. Until recently, relations between the genders were based on force, but now women in most places have increased scope for consent. [Russell’s recognition that the superior social position of men all derives from physical power had been (forcefully!) stated by his godfather, John Stuart Mill, in 1869: “the inequality of rights between men and women has no other source than the law of the strongest.”] The movement towards private freedom for women has been fostered by the increasing monopolization of all power by the state. Russell admits to exaggeration as he provides a pithy summary: “Women became emancipated from men in proportion as both became slaves of the State [p. 68].”
Cooperation between the genders and within the family originated in force. Fathers used force on their children, who then returned the favor when they grew up. Recognizing their eventual vulnerability, fathers built the honoring of parents into a mainstay of morality. “Filial piety is a good example of the way in which a superiority which is originally one of physical strength acquires the sanction of religion, and is thereby able to survive even when it is no longer sustained by superior strength [p. 68].” Another example of a religious precept growing out of superior strength is the biblical claim that women should submit to men.
Similar forces are at work on more macro scales. Some warrior tribe or clan imposes its will on a subject people, and over time, the clan becomes a hereditary aristocracy associated with religious virtues and worthy of special privileges. “The remarkable thing is that conquering aristocracies succeed in getting these views accepted by their subjects [p. 69].” Such is the origin of the divine right of kings, though aristocrats and nobles are loath to accept the military origin of their position. Many Indians resent British claims to superiority, which are founded on force; their own caste system has a similar basis, but became hallowed with time. Slavery, of course, also is based on force, and so are post-slavery social advantages claimed by the descendants of the slaveholders.
Now a word in praise of rule by the powerful. It may be that such an organization of power is the only feasible organization, that without rule through strength, there is no organization; rather, there is anarchy. Once government is consolidated by a forceful monarch and habits of law-abiding behavior are established, the government can transition to one that is responsive to popular will. [Shades, again, of Mill: "Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one."] The consolidation of a social unit generally is the hard part; the transition to a democratic form can be much smoother. And that consolidation (Russell echoes the Melian Dialogue), at first, restrains only the weak elements of the unit, while the powerful do as they will. Even murder is only a crime when an inferior kills a superior; the law will condone and even ease the homicides committed by the superior class.
We need to keep this process in mind today for a transition to world government, which is necessary for preventing war. United Nations-style voluntary associations must needs be weak, as individual nations will not be keen to relinquish their sovereignty. So the establishment of a world government must be the work of a strong power or a small group of strong powers. Once established, the world power can take on a more democratic hue. “This view, which I have held for the last thirty years, encounters vehement opposition from all people of liberal outlook, and also from all nationalists of whatever nation [p. 72].” The alternative, however, of waiting for voluntary surrender of authority, is not feasible.
Like it or not, we need to have world government imposed by a strong military force. One hundred years or so of enforced compliance can then give way to voluntary compliance, and a democratic world government can evolve. Any attempt to establish meaningful world government without military superiority will fall victim to the siren song of nationalism, the call to fight and die for freedom rather than to exist in a condition of servitude. Perhaps we could sidestep this logic if people were different than they now are – and maybe they can be different. “It will be necessary that individuals shall have less feeling of hostility and fear towards other individuals, more hope of security as regards their own lives, and a far more vivid realization that, in the world which modern technique has created, the need of world-wide co-operation is absolute, if mankind is to survive [p. 73].”
Humans can cooperate on an equal, voluntary basis, or greater force can compel submission. Until recently, relations between the genders were based on force, but now women in most places have increased scope for consent. [Russell’s recognition that the superior social position of men all derives from physical power had been (forcefully!) stated by his godfather, John Stuart Mill, in 1869: “the inequality of rights between men and women has no other source than the law of the strongest.”] The movement towards private freedom for women has been fostered by the increasing monopolization of all power by the state. Russell admits to exaggeration as he provides a pithy summary: “Women became emancipated from men in proportion as both became slaves of the State [p. 68].”
Cooperation between the genders and within the family originated in force. Fathers used force on their children, who then returned the favor when they grew up. Recognizing their eventual vulnerability, fathers built the honoring of parents into a mainstay of morality. “Filial piety is a good example of the way in which a superiority which is originally one of physical strength acquires the sanction of religion, and is thereby able to survive even when it is no longer sustained by superior strength [p. 68].” Another example of a religious precept growing out of superior strength is the biblical claim that women should submit to men.
Similar forces are at work on more macro scales. Some warrior tribe or clan imposes its will on a subject people, and over time, the clan becomes a hereditary aristocracy associated with religious virtues and worthy of special privileges. “The remarkable thing is that conquering aristocracies succeed in getting these views accepted by their subjects [p. 69].” Such is the origin of the divine right of kings, though aristocrats and nobles are loath to accept the military origin of their position. Many Indians resent British claims to superiority, which are founded on force; their own caste system has a similar basis, but became hallowed with time. Slavery, of course, also is based on force, and so are post-slavery social advantages claimed by the descendants of the slaveholders.
Now a word in praise of rule by the powerful. It may be that such an organization of power is the only feasible organization, that without rule through strength, there is no organization; rather, there is anarchy. Once government is consolidated by a forceful monarch and habits of law-abiding behavior are established, the government can transition to one that is responsive to popular will. [Shades, again, of Mill: "Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one."] The consolidation of a social unit generally is the hard part; the transition to a democratic form can be much smoother. And that consolidation (Russell echoes the Melian Dialogue), at first, restrains only the weak elements of the unit, while the powerful do as they will. Even murder is only a crime when an inferior kills a superior; the law will condone and even ease the homicides committed by the superior class.
We need to keep this process in mind today for a transition to world government, which is necessary for preventing war. United Nations-style voluntary associations must needs be weak, as individual nations will not be keen to relinquish their sovereignty. So the establishment of a world government must be the work of a strong power or a small group of strong powers. Once established, the world power can take on a more democratic hue. “This view, which I have held for the last thirty years, encounters vehement opposition from all people of liberal outlook, and also from all nationalists of whatever nation [p. 72].” The alternative, however, of waiting for voluntary surrender of authority, is not feasible.
Like it or not, we need to have world government imposed by a strong military force. One hundred years or so of enforced compliance can then give way to voluntary compliance, and a democratic world government can evolve. Any attempt to establish meaningful world government without military superiority will fall victim to the siren song of nationalism, the call to fight and die for freedom rather than to exist in a condition of servitude. Perhaps we could sidestep this logic if people were different than they now are – and maybe they can be different. “It will be necessary that individuals shall have less feeling of hostility and fear towards other individuals, more hope of security as regards their own lives, and a far more vivid realization that, in the world which modern technique has created, the need of world-wide co-operation is absolute, if mankind is to survive [p. 73].”
Saturday, March 16, 2013
New Hopes for a Changing World, Chapter Seven
“The Size of Social Units,” pages 59-66
Technical and psychological factors determine the size of social units. Psychological factors tend to constrain optimal extension before technical scale economies have been exhausted. The technical tradeoff is that larger organizations bring more people into cooperation, but large size begins to compromise unity. “Where Governments are concerned, the essential condition is that it must be possible to transmit orders and troops from the center in less time than it takes to organize a revolt [p. 59].” Traditionally, roads were the determining factor, but they have since been eclipsed by railways. Both the railroad and the telegraph greatly enlarged optimal state sizes – and then the plane came along. “A journey from London to Sydney is now a no more serious undertaking than a journey from London to Edinburgh was two hundred years ago [p. 60].”
Soon, any state will be able to attack any other state almost instantaneously. The optimal size of states has grown, and might be limitless, because military power requires huge and dispersed resources. [Adam Smith noted in The Wealth of Nations (V.1.43) how the invention of firearms tilted the military advantage to rich nations: “In modern war the great expence of fire-arms gives an evident advantage to the nation which can best afford that expence, and consequently to an opulent and civilized over a poor and barbarous nation. In ancient times the opulent and civilized found it difficult to defend themselves against the poor and barbarous nations. In modern times the poor and barbarous find it difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and civilized. The invention of fire-arms, an invention which at first sight appears to be so pernicious, is certainly favourable both to the permanency and to the extension of civilization.”] And large countries permit large free trade zones, themselves friends to opulence. Multiple countries could establish similarly large zones, but national prejudices seem to preclude them. [Would Bertie’s fondness for world government extend to the EU and WTO?]
In the past, empires generally were unthreatened by nationalistic uprisings, but now they make it very hard to hold power by force alone. “Most moderns accept nationalism as a natural phenomenon and do not realize how new it is [p. 62].” Communism is a powerful force, but it succumbed to nationalism in Yugoslavia. [Odd now to hear tragically multi-national Yugoslavia held up as a beacon of nationalism.]
State power is dominated by nationalism even though the state controls impressive means of propaganda in the press, radio, and schools. “Every child during the impressionable years is exposed to a point of view which, whether avowedly propagandist or not, is always such as might be expected to imbue the child with loyalty to his Government [p. 63].” Where states and nations are equivalent, this control inflates nationalism to new heights. British people today show much more connection to British military success than they did at the time of Nelson. But state propaganda fails when states are opposed to nations, as Britain found in Ireland.
Nationalism is stoked by crude means involving historical falsification and assertions of the moral superiority of the nation in question. Today’s Russian state wants to claim priority in all sorts of old inventions and discoveries, at the expense of Newton, Darwin, and Copernicus. “If men were anxious to live happily they would allow a committee of Unesco to pronounce on all such matters [pp. 63-64].”
Young people around the globe generally are taught history in ways that will lead them to exaggerate their nation’s chances of victory in the next encounter. This over-optimism breeds over-war in the future. Nationalism is the major force driving humanity to extinction. In America, the nationalism of the Republicans is so extreme that they cling to it despite it being obviously counterproductive to their own aims. They choose to insult foreigners whose assistance is requisite in advancing American policy. “The Republicans apparently feel that if America could only prosper by causing other nations to prosper, then it would be better to fail [p. 65].”
Nationalism is not the only bar to social cohesion and to enlightened self-interest. In ancient Greece, strains within city-states between democrats and oligarchs prevented Greek unity. (The Romans soon enough reduced the import of these disputes to the level of neighborhood political spats.) A similar dynamic played out in Renaissance Italy, and modern Western Europe is hosting a revival.
Sadism, the love of cruelty and of seeing some enemy punished, is the psychological barrier to the unity we need to survive. Unity cannot be maintained if the love of cruelty is merely suppressed; rather, it must be extirpated. “It is possible, and in slightly different circumstances it would be easy, to live happily – far more happily indeed than anyone now lives – without malice and hatred and the desire for victory in disastrous contests [p. 66].” But this is a topic postponed until part three, “Man and Himself”.
Technical and psychological factors determine the size of social units. Psychological factors tend to constrain optimal extension before technical scale economies have been exhausted. The technical tradeoff is that larger organizations bring more people into cooperation, but large size begins to compromise unity. “Where Governments are concerned, the essential condition is that it must be possible to transmit orders and troops from the center in less time than it takes to organize a revolt [p. 59].” Traditionally, roads were the determining factor, but they have since been eclipsed by railways. Both the railroad and the telegraph greatly enlarged optimal state sizes – and then the plane came along. “A journey from London to Sydney is now a no more serious undertaking than a journey from London to Edinburgh was two hundred years ago [p. 60].”
Soon, any state will be able to attack any other state almost instantaneously. The optimal size of states has grown, and might be limitless, because military power requires huge and dispersed resources. [Adam Smith noted in The Wealth of Nations (V.1.43) how the invention of firearms tilted the military advantage to rich nations: “In modern war the great expence of fire-arms gives an evident advantage to the nation which can best afford that expence, and consequently to an opulent and civilized over a poor and barbarous nation. In ancient times the opulent and civilized found it difficult to defend themselves against the poor and barbarous nations. In modern times the poor and barbarous find it difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and civilized. The invention of fire-arms, an invention which at first sight appears to be so pernicious, is certainly favourable both to the permanency and to the extension of civilization.”] And large countries permit large free trade zones, themselves friends to opulence. Multiple countries could establish similarly large zones, but national prejudices seem to preclude them. [Would Bertie’s fondness for world government extend to the EU and WTO?]
In the past, empires generally were unthreatened by nationalistic uprisings, but now they make it very hard to hold power by force alone. “Most moderns accept nationalism as a natural phenomenon and do not realize how new it is [p. 62].” Communism is a powerful force, but it succumbed to nationalism in Yugoslavia. [Odd now to hear tragically multi-national Yugoslavia held up as a beacon of nationalism.]
State power is dominated by nationalism even though the state controls impressive means of propaganda in the press, radio, and schools. “Every child during the impressionable years is exposed to a point of view which, whether avowedly propagandist or not, is always such as might be expected to imbue the child with loyalty to his Government [p. 63].” Where states and nations are equivalent, this control inflates nationalism to new heights. British people today show much more connection to British military success than they did at the time of Nelson. But state propaganda fails when states are opposed to nations, as Britain found in Ireland.
Nationalism is stoked by crude means involving historical falsification and assertions of the moral superiority of the nation in question. Today’s Russian state wants to claim priority in all sorts of old inventions and discoveries, at the expense of Newton, Darwin, and Copernicus. “If men were anxious to live happily they would allow a committee of Unesco to pronounce on all such matters [pp. 63-64].”
Young people around the globe generally are taught history in ways that will lead them to exaggerate their nation’s chances of victory in the next encounter. This over-optimism breeds over-war in the future. Nationalism is the major force driving humanity to extinction. In America, the nationalism of the Republicans is so extreme that they cling to it despite it being obviously counterproductive to their own aims. They choose to insult foreigners whose assistance is requisite in advancing American policy. “The Republicans apparently feel that if America could only prosper by causing other nations to prosper, then it would be better to fail [p. 65].”
Nationalism is not the only bar to social cohesion and to enlightened self-interest. In ancient Greece, strains within city-states between democrats and oligarchs prevented Greek unity. (The Romans soon enough reduced the import of these disputes to the level of neighborhood political spats.) A similar dynamic played out in Renaissance Italy, and modern Western Europe is hosting a revival.
Sadism, the love of cruelty and of seeing some enemy punished, is the psychological barrier to the unity we need to survive. Unity cannot be maintained if the love of cruelty is merely suppressed; rather, it must be extirpated. “It is possible, and in slightly different circumstances it would be easy, to live happily – far more happily indeed than anyone now lives – without malice and hatred and the desire for victory in disastrous contests [p. 66].” But this is a topic postponed until part three, “Man and Himself”.
Friday, March 15, 2013
New Hopes for a Changing World, Chapter Six
“Social Units,” pages 53-58
“Every man feels himself at once an individual and a member of a group, and it is because both these feelings are so deeply engrained in his nature that he has found it necessary to make moral codes and prohibitions and a vast apparatus of praise and blame [p. 53].” Problems arise when individual self-interest takes precedence, despite harm to overall human flourishing.
The need for infants – and for moms engaged in childrearing – to be protected lies at the basis of family relations. But long ago, in-groups expanded beyond the family, to larger agglomerations such as tribes. People tend to be cooperative to those in the in-group, but rivalrous towards outsiders. Harmony within the in-group is threatened by sexual competition, and various customs – including the incest taboo and rules concerning exogamy – help to mitigate that competition. The power of custom can be glimpsed by means of the incest taboo. Almost no one seems constrained by it, yet it requires a serious subjugation of instinct.
Social groups could find themselves competing for food, with war as the predictable result. Larger groups have an advantage in physical conflicts, pressuring tribes to take on larger populations. The larger social units do not have the same instinctual basis for loyalty and cooperation as does the family, however. Nonetheless, when even a group as large as a nation is threatened, its citizens rally to the cause. “So long as we have common external enemies, hostility between England and Scotland will be kept within limits, but incidents like the Stone of Scone show how easily it could break out [p. 57].” A major question (p. 58) exists as to the extent to which a psychological connection to large groups can be inculcated through education and propaganda, when it does not exist naturally.
New social groups erode the power of old ones; thus, the welfare state has diminished the role of the pater familias (and his sometimes despotic wife), which used to extend both broadly and deep. [Russell is echoing an argument he made in multiple places in Marriage and Morals.] Now, much of the world is centered around nuclear families. A totalitarian state might eliminate the family, as in The Republic.
The notion that centralized centers of power tend to undermine smaller, decentralized ones holds beyond the family. Large organizations enervate smaller ones. “But sometimes the larger organizations fail to flourish, and centrifugal forces prevail [p. 57].” A precipitate step towards a global state might fall into one of those “fail to flourish” cases, and strengthen nation-states. The tiny moves that actually have been attempted towards global governance so far perhaps are a case in point.
“Every man feels himself at once an individual and a member of a group, and it is because both these feelings are so deeply engrained in his nature that he has found it necessary to make moral codes and prohibitions and a vast apparatus of praise and blame [p. 53].” Problems arise when individual self-interest takes precedence, despite harm to overall human flourishing.
The need for infants – and for moms engaged in childrearing – to be protected lies at the basis of family relations. But long ago, in-groups expanded beyond the family, to larger agglomerations such as tribes. People tend to be cooperative to those in the in-group, but rivalrous towards outsiders. Harmony within the in-group is threatened by sexual competition, and various customs – including the incest taboo and rules concerning exogamy – help to mitigate that competition. The power of custom can be glimpsed by means of the incest taboo. Almost no one seems constrained by it, yet it requires a serious subjugation of instinct.
Social groups could find themselves competing for food, with war as the predictable result. Larger groups have an advantage in physical conflicts, pressuring tribes to take on larger populations. The larger social units do not have the same instinctual basis for loyalty and cooperation as does the family, however. Nonetheless, when even a group as large as a nation is threatened, its citizens rally to the cause. “So long as we have common external enemies, hostility between England and Scotland will be kept within limits, but incidents like the Stone of Scone show how easily it could break out [p. 57].” A major question (p. 58) exists as to the extent to which a psychological connection to large groups can be inculcated through education and propaganda, when it does not exist naturally.
New social groups erode the power of old ones; thus, the welfare state has diminished the role of the pater familias (and his sometimes despotic wife), which used to extend both broadly and deep. [Russell is echoing an argument he made in multiple places in Marriage and Morals.] Now, much of the world is centered around nuclear families. A totalitarian state might eliminate the family, as in The Republic.
The notion that centralized centers of power tend to undermine smaller, decentralized ones holds beyond the family. Large organizations enervate smaller ones. “But sometimes the larger organizations fail to flourish, and centrifugal forces prevail [p. 57].” A precipitate step towards a global state might fall into one of those “fail to flourish” cases, and strengthen nation-states. The tiny moves that actually have been attempted towards global governance so far perhaps are a case in point.
Friday, February 1, 2013
New Hopes for a Changing World, End of the First Period
Bertrand Russell tells us at the beginning of New Hopes for a Changing World that he intends to keep hope alive, though not by succumbing to foolish, unmoored optimism. Progress is not foreordained – but it can be achieved. Russell will recognize our constraints, indicate our predicament, and chart a path ahead.
The conflict between Man and Nature forms the subject matter for the first part of New Hopes for a Changing World. Science and technology have altered the terms of the conflict in recent centuries, but not eliminated it, nor will they do so in the future. (Industrialization not only alters the man/nature nexus, it simultaneously destabilizes inter- and intra-human conflicts.) Economic and technical progress alone cannot ensure higher living standards, given population increases and the deterioration of our environmental and natural resource capital stocks. Much of the world already is overpopulated, yet religious moralists refuse to provide access to information about contraception – they prefer to see population growth checked by higher death rates, not lower birth rates. Even though one might guess from human actions that people apparently want to leave a multitude of descendants, with access to contraception and an end to moralizing against it, population growth can be stemmed without coercion.
Russell’s alarm about population growth appears a little dated now. Population has increased much faster than Russell envisioned, and in many places, much misery did indeed accompany the growth. Nonetheless, living standards around most of the world have gone up, often substantially, even in places like India that Russell singled out as particularly overpopulated. Japan, another country whose population was a concern to Bertie, saw negative population growth during 2008-2010.
Of course, the moral and legal attack on contraception has diminished since New Hopes for a Changing World was written. Access to contraception received constitutional protection in the United States in 1965, and the AIDS crisis spurred the promotion of safer sex practices that also would lead to fewer unwanted pregnancies. (The recent upswell of anti-contraception political positions in the US has not succeeded in reversing this trend, I believe.) In the US, though Catholic leaders still adhere to an anti-contraception line, most practicing Catholics do not share those views.
In Chapter V, Russell noted Condorcet’s optimistic stance on population. This led me to look into Condorcet’s “Outlines of an historical view of the progress of the human mind,” which bears many similarities to New Hopes for a Changing World. (Condorcet does seem to have a little more unmoored optimism than does Russell; but then, Russell was privy to Condorcet’s fate.) Need we fear that increasing mastery over nature will prove self-defeating, that the induced increase in population will eventually so press against available resources that people will die in misery? According to Condorcet,
Nature having been handled, it’s on to Man and Man…
The conflict between Man and Nature forms the subject matter for the first part of New Hopes for a Changing World. Science and technology have altered the terms of the conflict in recent centuries, but not eliminated it, nor will they do so in the future. (Industrialization not only alters the man/nature nexus, it simultaneously destabilizes inter- and intra-human conflicts.) Economic and technical progress alone cannot ensure higher living standards, given population increases and the deterioration of our environmental and natural resource capital stocks. Much of the world already is overpopulated, yet religious moralists refuse to provide access to information about contraception – they prefer to see population growth checked by higher death rates, not lower birth rates. Even though one might guess from human actions that people apparently want to leave a multitude of descendants, with access to contraception and an end to moralizing against it, population growth can be stemmed without coercion.
Russell’s alarm about population growth appears a little dated now. Population has increased much faster than Russell envisioned, and in many places, much misery did indeed accompany the growth. Nonetheless, living standards around most of the world have gone up, often substantially, even in places like India that Russell singled out as particularly overpopulated. Japan, another country whose population was a concern to Bertie, saw negative population growth during 2008-2010.
Of course, the moral and legal attack on contraception has diminished since New Hopes for a Changing World was written. Access to contraception received constitutional protection in the United States in 1965, and the AIDS crisis spurred the promotion of safer sex practices that also would lead to fewer unwanted pregnancies. (The recent upswell of anti-contraception political positions in the US has not succeeded in reversing this trend, I believe.) In the US, though Catholic leaders still adhere to an anti-contraception line, most practicing Catholics do not share those views.
In Chapter V, Russell noted Condorcet’s optimistic stance on population. This led me to look into Condorcet’s “Outlines of an historical view of the progress of the human mind,” which bears many similarities to New Hopes for a Changing World. (Condorcet does seem to have a little more unmoored optimism than does Russell; but then, Russell was privy to Condorcet’s fate.) Need we fear that increasing mastery over nature will prove self-defeating, that the induced increase in population will eventually so press against available resources that people will die in misery? According to Condorcet,
...there would result from it [the induced increase in population] nothing alarming, either to the happiness of the human race, or its indefinite perfectibility; if we consider, that prior to this period the progress of reason will have walked hand in hand with that of the sciences; that the absurd prejudices of superstition will have ceased to infuse into morality a harshness that corrupts and degrades, instead of purifying and exalting it; that men will then know, that the duties they may be under relative to propagation will consist not in the question of giving existence to a greater number of beings, but happiness; will have for their object, the general welfare of the human species; of the society in which they live; of the family to which they are attached; and not the puerile idea of encumbering the earth with useless and wretched mortals. Accordingly, there might then be a limit to the possible mass of provision, and of consequence to the greatest possible population, without that premature destruction, so contrary to nature and to social prosperity, of a portion of the beings who may have received life, being the result of those limits.Like Russell, Condorcet contemplates man as being in the infancy of his freedom, and supposes that maturity will bring wonders beyond what currently can be foreseen.
Nature having been handled, it’s on to Man and Man…
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