The first section of New Hopes for a Changing World takes on the conflict between Man and Nature; the now-completed (by RBR) second section looks at the conflict between Man and Man. In this section, Russell sees technological and military considerations as raising the optimal size of social units, but he recognizes nationalism as an important counterforce; perhaps the upcoming Scottish independence referendum is a case in point.
Nobel prize-winning economist Ronald Coase passed away earlier this month. Some of Coase’s best known work parallels Russell’s analysis of the size of social units. In his 1937 article “The Nature of the Firm,” Coase looks into the optimal size of corporations in a market economy – and like Russell, sees that agency problems, the difficulty of controlling large numbers of people through centralized commands, are a limiting factor. Further, though a rather staunch free-market thinker, Coase does not have a strong commitment to the notion that individuals make their decisions in a rational fashion. (Russell points to substantial free trade zones as one of the advantages that accrue to large nations.) Russell’s observation that biased education leads to overly optimistic views of military adventures – and hence to even more war – perhaps would have been agreeable to Coase. I wonder if Coase, who was British (and was born in 1910), ever met Russell?
Russell sees the formation of the rule of law in Marxian terms, as the establishment of the rule of the powerful. (From The Communist Manifesto: “Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will, whose essential character and direction are determined by the economical conditions of existence of your class….The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class.” From Russell: “Property, in fact, is what the dominant political group chooses that it should be [p. 78].”) But order probably is better than anarchy, and offers the potential for transition to more democratic systems. World Government might have to follow from the usual historical pattern, where it is imposed by one or more powerful nations, but eventually develops independent legitimacy. The Marxian notion that class struggle will disappear following a revolution is a mirage, in part because the negative motivations that underlie Marx’s thinking will survive the revolution.
Communist-style ideas of full equality would lead to poor consequences, as socially beneficial acts would not be sufficiently incentivized, nor socially detrimental acts deterred. But this is only a theoretical concern, as the departures from equality currently are so severe that they themselves lead to inferior consequences, chiefly social instability. No justice, no peace, Russell seems to say, both within a nation and at the international level. So economic development of the currently poorer countries is necessary for global stability and for curtailing racial animus.
Russell uses historically-informed logic to make his case for World Government (Chapter 11). A global system of competitive nation states has always brought war. While the payoff to winners from a war has diminished, or become negative, the overall danger from war has increased with more terrible weaponry. We cannot maintain the old system of nation-states if we are to have a good chance of survival. Hence, we need an armed world government, one that will punish any militarily aggressive states. Russell does not examine the difficulty in determining which state is the aggressor, but there is some ambiguity even in seemingly obvious cases like World War II, and virtually all military adventures are characterized, and not without some justification, as humanitarian.
Three sources of human strife that must be neutralized to give peace a chance are economic, racial, and ideological conflicts. The spread of toleration and enlightenment can help to reduce these conflicts, especially in the face of the rising toll that even a winning war brings. (Enlightened economic self-interest would even indicate a cooperative, altrusitic approach towards other countries.) Marxism in practice is intolerant of the bourgeoisie, who thus respond with equal intolerance when Marxism gathers a following. In some sense, this second section of New Hopes for a Changing World is focused on anti-dogmatism – also the focus of Unpopular Essays, which was published only one year earlier.
Russell holds Keynes’s approach to macroeconomic policy in high esteem, believing that it offers a serviceable cure for sustained unemployment. Russell is in good company, even if the Keynesian solution no longer holds the same luster. Russell’s encapsulation of macroeconomic distress as arising when private interest undermines the public interest (as with Keynes’s Paradox of Thrift) continues to be relevant, as does his recognition of the tendency of capitalism to evolve into state capitalism.
Russell foresaw the post-war economic renaissance in western Europe. along with the (eventual) softening inside Russia – although the emergence of a world government in the wake of the end of the cold war did not come to pass. Nonetheless, the international human rights project, which was all but non-existent when New Hopes was penned, has come a long way, and is helping to improve the situation for once (and sometimes still) marginalized groups like women and gays.
Despite his criticism of Marx and Lenin, Russell’s vision of the future involves a major role for a vanguard, which comprises some scientists and others devoted to world economic development, as well as sane, anti-dogmatic humanitarians; their work and example can help make today’s new hopes into tomorrow’s realities.
Friday, September 20, 2013
Tuesday, September 17, 2013
New Hopes for a Changing World, Chapter Fifteen
“The Next Half-Century,” pages 136-144
This chapter of a book concerning new hopes opens: “The twentieth century so far has not been a credit to the human race [p. 136].” The welcome demise of emperors led to an unwelcome succession by the likes of Hitler and Stalin, with enormous human costs, including some specific mass atrocities, involved in the transition. As bad as the twentieth century has been so far, the second half holds a much worse prospect, that the world and all its people can be destroyed at any moment.
Western leaders need a sober appreciation of the dangers, but the current fearful response leads nowhere. Western policy, of course, must start with the military might necessary to protect western Europe. The security thereby achieved will lead to a renaissance in France, West Germany, and Italy – and this will prevent world war, if the US will be mellow. A mellow America, in turn, might allow the Russians to put aside their understandable fears that they are threatened with conquest by the West. The internal regime in Russia will soften, permitting the negotiated establishment of a world government by the end of the century.
Asia and Africa need economic development, lest envy ignite violence. It is in the interest of rich countries to devote considerable resources to raising living standards in poorer countries – even in their direct economic interest, as prosperity, as well as poverty, tends to propagate across borders.
The economic development of Africa and Asia requires, as Russell argued in Chapter Five, population control. Though many westerners perceive religious and other barriers to contraception in poor countries, these barriers can be overcome. “I do not think any reasonable person can doubt that in India, China and Japan, if the knowledge of birth-control existed, the birth-rate would fall very rapidly [p. 139].” Africa, too, could see its population checked by the availability of medical clinics that would disseminate the relevant information, though the US will be unlikely to aid such clinics because of Catholic political force. The British and French, who have more substantial interests in Africa, eventually could fill in for the Americans, however.
The history of imperialism renders suspicious any activity of the US, Britain, and France, in Asia or Africa. The Russians, no less imperialist, nonetheless are not perceived as a similar threat. It is a very delicate matter for the West to engage Asia and Africa where such engagement is fruitful, while avoiding the excesses of imperialism. “It will be very regrettable if the cessation of Western imperialism prevents the spread of what is good in Western ways of life [pages 140-141].” Western scientists and technicians of a philanthropic bent can be the unthreatening vanguard in helping export economic development, educational progress, and improved healthcare.
Religious and nationalistic fanaticism (recall Chapter Thirteen) continue to threaten future prosperity. Even legitimate interests in national independence, as in Iran, are premature given the political realities of the Cold War. Nor can lingering dreams of isolationism be maintained – humanity is an interconnected, global family, and like all families, we can quarrel or maintain harmonious relations.
International cooperation requires that people be educated in a broad manner, not in the crude, nationalistic style that generally holds sway. The history books should be as impartial as possible, perhaps by having scholars from neutral countries write the history of other places (like Olympic judging?). “Children should from an early age be made aware of the modern interdependence of different groups of men, and the importance of co-operation and the folly of conflict [p. 142].” They should know of freedom and possibility, and not be led to think of the past of prohibitions and wars as if it is the present.
Intolerance towards the prejudiced teachers of hate and hostility is called for. Violent conflict is almost always an inefficient means for securing change: Britain has peaceably progressed in recent years beyond anything achieved by the bloodbath of revolution in Russia and France. Hatred doesn’t dissipate just because the object of hatred has been overcome; rather, it seeks out new horizons. Social reformers primarily should stress, when possible, the future benefits, not the negative features of the status quo. A focus on negative features also risks missing the deeper causes when ameliorating the intolerable conditions – and hence makes recurrence likely.
“The world could within a couple of generations be made to consist of men and women who would be happy and sane, and because they were happy and sane, would be kindly in their impulses towards others, since they would have no impulse to regard others as their enemies in the absence of positive evidence [pages 143-144].” Our knowledge of the development of character should be put to use in inculcating this kindliness.
Mankind would survive a third world war. (One year later, Russell was less certain.) Such an event, however, would bring to a standstill the process of advancing global peace and sanity. Eventually, however, our duty will be to reignite that process. (Russell employs in passing what became Reverend Jesse Jackson’s signature line, “keep hope alive.”) Mankind learns slowly, and through suffering – perhaps more suffering than they have already endured – even when the material to be learned points the way to future wellbeing. There must be some individuals today whose sanity and hope will provide the guide to others. The more sane, hopeful people there are, the better the chance that the result of suffering will indeed be the insight to drive us forward.
This chapter of a book concerning new hopes opens: “The twentieth century so far has not been a credit to the human race [p. 136].” The welcome demise of emperors led to an unwelcome succession by the likes of Hitler and Stalin, with enormous human costs, including some specific mass atrocities, involved in the transition. As bad as the twentieth century has been so far, the second half holds a much worse prospect, that the world and all its people can be destroyed at any moment.
Western leaders need a sober appreciation of the dangers, but the current fearful response leads nowhere. Western policy, of course, must start with the military might necessary to protect western Europe. The security thereby achieved will lead to a renaissance in France, West Germany, and Italy – and this will prevent world war, if the US will be mellow. A mellow America, in turn, might allow the Russians to put aside their understandable fears that they are threatened with conquest by the West. The internal regime in Russia will soften, permitting the negotiated establishment of a world government by the end of the century.
Asia and Africa need economic development, lest envy ignite violence. It is in the interest of rich countries to devote considerable resources to raising living standards in poorer countries – even in their direct economic interest, as prosperity, as well as poverty, tends to propagate across borders.
The economic development of Africa and Asia requires, as Russell argued in Chapter Five, population control. Though many westerners perceive religious and other barriers to contraception in poor countries, these barriers can be overcome. “I do not think any reasonable person can doubt that in India, China and Japan, if the knowledge of birth-control existed, the birth-rate would fall very rapidly [p. 139].” Africa, too, could see its population checked by the availability of medical clinics that would disseminate the relevant information, though the US will be unlikely to aid such clinics because of Catholic political force. The British and French, who have more substantial interests in Africa, eventually could fill in for the Americans, however.
The history of imperialism renders suspicious any activity of the US, Britain, and France, in Asia or Africa. The Russians, no less imperialist, nonetheless are not perceived as a similar threat. It is a very delicate matter for the West to engage Asia and Africa where such engagement is fruitful, while avoiding the excesses of imperialism. “It will be very regrettable if the cessation of Western imperialism prevents the spread of what is good in Western ways of life [pages 140-141].” Western scientists and technicians of a philanthropic bent can be the unthreatening vanguard in helping export economic development, educational progress, and improved healthcare.
Religious and nationalistic fanaticism (recall Chapter Thirteen) continue to threaten future prosperity. Even legitimate interests in national independence, as in Iran, are premature given the political realities of the Cold War. Nor can lingering dreams of isolationism be maintained – humanity is an interconnected, global family, and like all families, we can quarrel or maintain harmonious relations.
International cooperation requires that people be educated in a broad manner, not in the crude, nationalistic style that generally holds sway. The history books should be as impartial as possible, perhaps by having scholars from neutral countries write the history of other places (like Olympic judging?). “Children should from an early age be made aware of the modern interdependence of different groups of men, and the importance of co-operation and the folly of conflict [p. 142].” They should know of freedom and possibility, and not be led to think of the past of prohibitions and wars as if it is the present.
Intolerance towards the prejudiced teachers of hate and hostility is called for. Violent conflict is almost always an inefficient means for securing change: Britain has peaceably progressed in recent years beyond anything achieved by the bloodbath of revolution in Russia and France. Hatred doesn’t dissipate just because the object of hatred has been overcome; rather, it seeks out new horizons. Social reformers primarily should stress, when possible, the future benefits, not the negative features of the status quo. A focus on negative features also risks missing the deeper causes when ameliorating the intolerable conditions – and hence makes recurrence likely.
“The world could within a couple of generations be made to consist of men and women who would be happy and sane, and because they were happy and sane, would be kindly in their impulses towards others, since they would have no impulse to regard others as their enemies in the absence of positive evidence [pages 143-144].” Our knowledge of the development of character should be put to use in inculcating this kindliness.
Mankind would survive a third world war. (One year later, Russell was less certain.) Such an event, however, would bring to a standstill the process of advancing global peace and sanity. Eventually, however, our duty will be to reignite that process. (Russell employs in passing what became Reverend Jesse Jackson’s signature line, “keep hope alive.”) Mankind learns slowly, and through suffering – perhaps more suffering than they have already endured – even when the material to be learned points the way to future wellbeing. There must be some individuals today whose sanity and hope will provide the guide to others. The more sane, hopeful people there are, the better the chance that the result of suffering will indeed be the insight to drive us forward.
Saturday, August 17, 2013
New Hopes for a Changing World, Chapter Fourteen
“Economic Co-operation and Competition,” pages 126-135
The theoretical musings of economists have obscured the central ideas of their discipline. Further, the dependence of economics on law has been relatively neglected by economics writers – and Russell tells us (page 126) he will start by similarly ignoring this dependence.
A male resident in a primitive community who wants to grow food must play a state-like role by providing physical protection of his land, and a capitalist-like role by requiring that his wife help him farm. The state role deals with competition, and the capitalist role with cooperation. In simple village life, households are largely self-sufficient, so more extensive cooperation or competition rarely enters the picture.
The competitive markets of classical economics require a legal structure that already is protective of property possession and offers protection for exchange, too. As economies develop, a currency that offers some stability becomes necessary. Competition is kept within tight bounds – physical force against a competing producer is not a permissible approach, unless you are a state.
Free competition, so the argument went, would produce wonders including low prices for consumers and the proliferation of the best production methods. The cotton trade of 1800 demonstrated the logic, and the results were wondrous – except for the slaves and the other workers (“but they did not write the economic textbooks [p. 128]”).
Somehow the free trade utopia led to combinations among producers and eventually, following great struggle, among workers. Marx’s view that competition would result in monopoly was borne out in railroads and oil. Anti-trust actions were initiated in response, but the sole “victory” was in securing the imprisonment of Eugene Debs.
Intra-national competition marks an early, transient stage of capitalism. Eventually, the state takes over the major corporations, or vice versa. State control, the usual outcome, then involves competition between nations, not between individual producers. So the extent to which the British can sell automobiles in America is determined not by the forces of free competition, but by government decisions in the US and the UK.
Technological advance means cooperation is much more important than competition – indeed, most economic relations are not of the zero-sum sort. Nations and industries are economically interdependent. Exchange is about cooperation, as is melding together the various elements of the production chain. Counties need other countries to be prosperous to maintain their own economy, but it is hard to think of foreign nations outside the lens of economic competition. [Here is Adam Smith in the Theory of Moral Sentiments (VI.II.28): “France and England may each of them have some reason to dread the increase of the naval and military power of the other; but for either of them to envy the internal happiness and prosperity of the other, the cultivation of its lands, the advancement of its manufactures, the increase of its commerce, the security and number of its ports and harbours, its proficiency in all the liberal arts and sciences, is surely beneath the dignity of two such great nations. These are all real improvements of the world we live in. Mankind are benefited, human nature is ennobled by them. In such improvements each nation ought, not only to endeavour itself to excel, but from the love of mankind, to promote, instead of obstructing the excellence of its neighbours. These are all proper objects of national emulation, not of national prejudice or envy.”]
High fixed costs of good-specific capital (which cannot easily be redeployed) imply that a change in the economic climate can lead to large losses, which cascade throughout the system, as in the Depression. Private interests (to cut back on spending, to call in loans) undermine the social interest, as when a panic causes death by trampling. Classical econ was powerless to deal with the depression. “Roosevelt saved the situation by bold and heretical action [pages 132-133].” Of course, the businessmen he saved showed no gratitude, devoted as they were to outdated economics.
The Roosevelt approach, spending to stimulate the economy, now is needed internationally. The Marshall plan is good for the US economy as well as for the European economies. A broader implementation of Marshall-like aid would not be amiss.
Unused machines are bad, but unused labor is worse, in that the laborers themselves suffer. (Further, the negative effects are felt far afield, too, in other countries – page 135.) Keynes seems to have found the key to preventing large-scale unemployment and ending the trade cycle, and governments should avail themselves of his policies.
Economic interdependence means that the prosperity of your own nation is tied to the prosperity of other nations. International organizations understand this, even if the US Congress is not fully on board. “I have no doubt that the world would now be richer if people were actuated in their economic relations with other nations by altruism and a disinterested desire to avert suffering [page 135].” Cooperation is the path recommended by enlightened self-interest. The popularity of hatred, despite its high costs, seems to attest to how much people enjoy hate, alas.
The theoretical musings of economists have obscured the central ideas of their discipline. Further, the dependence of economics on law has been relatively neglected by economics writers – and Russell tells us (page 126) he will start by similarly ignoring this dependence.
A male resident in a primitive community who wants to grow food must play a state-like role by providing physical protection of his land, and a capitalist-like role by requiring that his wife help him farm. The state role deals with competition, and the capitalist role with cooperation. In simple village life, households are largely self-sufficient, so more extensive cooperation or competition rarely enters the picture.
The competitive markets of classical economics require a legal structure that already is protective of property possession and offers protection for exchange, too. As economies develop, a currency that offers some stability becomes necessary. Competition is kept within tight bounds – physical force against a competing producer is not a permissible approach, unless you are a state.
Free competition, so the argument went, would produce wonders including low prices for consumers and the proliferation of the best production methods. The cotton trade of 1800 demonstrated the logic, and the results were wondrous – except for the slaves and the other workers (“but they did not write the economic textbooks [p. 128]”).
Somehow the free trade utopia led to combinations among producers and eventually, following great struggle, among workers. Marx’s view that competition would result in monopoly was borne out in railroads and oil. Anti-trust actions were initiated in response, but the sole “victory” was in securing the imprisonment of Eugene Debs.
Intra-national competition marks an early, transient stage of capitalism. Eventually, the state takes over the major corporations, or vice versa. State control, the usual outcome, then involves competition between nations, not between individual producers. So the extent to which the British can sell automobiles in America is determined not by the forces of free competition, but by government decisions in the US and the UK.
Technological advance means cooperation is much more important than competition – indeed, most economic relations are not of the zero-sum sort. Nations and industries are economically interdependent. Exchange is about cooperation, as is melding together the various elements of the production chain. Counties need other countries to be prosperous to maintain their own economy, but it is hard to think of foreign nations outside the lens of economic competition. [Here is Adam Smith in the Theory of Moral Sentiments (VI.II.28): “France and England may each of them have some reason to dread the increase of the naval and military power of the other; but for either of them to envy the internal happiness and prosperity of the other, the cultivation of its lands, the advancement of its manufactures, the increase of its commerce, the security and number of its ports and harbours, its proficiency in all the liberal arts and sciences, is surely beneath the dignity of two such great nations. These are all real improvements of the world we live in. Mankind are benefited, human nature is ennobled by them. In such improvements each nation ought, not only to endeavour itself to excel, but from the love of mankind, to promote, instead of obstructing the excellence of its neighbours. These are all proper objects of national emulation, not of national prejudice or envy.”]
High fixed costs of good-specific capital (which cannot easily be redeployed) imply that a change in the economic climate can lead to large losses, which cascade throughout the system, as in the Depression. Private interests (to cut back on spending, to call in loans) undermine the social interest, as when a panic causes death by trampling. Classical econ was powerless to deal with the depression. “Roosevelt saved the situation by bold and heretical action [pages 132-133].” Of course, the businessmen he saved showed no gratitude, devoted as they were to outdated economics.
The Roosevelt approach, spending to stimulate the economy, now is needed internationally. The Marshall plan is good for the US economy as well as for the European economies. A broader implementation of Marshall-like aid would not be amiss.
Unused machines are bad, but unused labor is worse, in that the laborers themselves suffer. (Further, the negative effects are felt far afield, too, in other countries – page 135.) Keynes seems to have found the key to preventing large-scale unemployment and ending the trade cycle, and governments should avail themselves of his policies.
Economic interdependence means that the prosperity of your own nation is tied to the prosperity of other nations. International organizations understand this, even if the US Congress is not fully on board. “I have no doubt that the world would now be richer if people were actuated in their economic relations with other nations by altruism and a disinterested desire to avert suffering [page 135].” Cooperation is the path recommended by enlightened self-interest. The popularity of hatred, despite its high costs, seems to attest to how much people enjoy hate, alas.
Saturday, July 27, 2013
New Hopes for a Changing World, Chapter Thirteen
“Creeds and Ideologies,” pages 111-125
Ideologies compete with (and sometimes complement) race and economic interests as sources of division. Differing ideologies can co-exist peacefully, unless extreme intolerance also is involved. Ancient religions didn’t require exclusivity – and hence intolerance of infidels – but Judaism changed that, and was followed in that practice by Christianity. After the Roman Empire adopted Christianity, intolerance not only was instituted for non-Christians, but also for the wrong species of Christian. When Islam developed, the intolerance on both the Christian and the Muslim sides led to war.
The religious strife of the Middle Ages became even more bloody in the 16th and 17th centuries. “At length, in view of the inconclusiveness of the struggle, a few enlightened nations, led by the Dutch, discovered that it was possible for Protestants and Catholics to live peaceably side by side [p. 113].” The French Revolution allowed Catholic countries to substitute political for religious strife.
The notion that “Western values” include religious toleration does not comport with the historical record: Europe actually was less tolerant than other continents. The Western intolerance only subsided when neither side could be extirpated.
The century of comparative European peace starting in 1815 ended abruptly in 1914. Those of Russell’s generation thought that the progress of the nineteenth century was the template for the future – instead of being a brief respite from darkness. “The practice of toleration, liberty and enlightenment had spread with astonishing rapidity [p. 114].” With hindsight, we can see the gathering storms, but the onset of World War I met with a mentally unprepared Europe; as a result, nations piled blunder upon blunder.
In the two centuries up to 1914, there have been times where fanatics held the reins, but generally these were brief intervals, even during the French Revolution. The post-World War I era has seen a much greater degree of fanaticism in power, and not only from Russia’s Bolsheviks. The competing fanaticisms, including the Cold War version, make it impossible to move in concert to a world government.
Soviet fanaticism derives from Marx and from Russian history. Pre-Marx socialists tended to be benevolent humanists. Marx had no use for what he thought of as their utopian schemes. His rather deterministic doctrine even marginalized the need to persuade opponents. His system in practice involved hatred of the bourgeoisie, though they were, again by his lights, only playing their own historical role – a sort of class-based predestination not unlike Calvin’s. “Naturally the propertied classes, wherever his creed spread, were terrified into violent reaction, and the vague good-natured liberalism of the middle nineteenth century gave way to a blacker and fiercer outlook [pages 116-117].”
The Marxian message found an appreciative audience among those who would prosper when the existing order is overturned. But as ordinary workers experienced improved living conditions in advanced countries, Marxism held less appeal. Hence it was in Russia, not in a highly developed capitalist nation, that Marxists took control, despite the relatively tiny Russian proletariat.
Bertie relates that he personally knew Bebel and Liebknecht, and found them to be gentle humanitarians. In these German communists, as well as in other radicals of the late nineteenth century, the cruelty that became pronounced in Bolshevik communism was not visible.
Lenin’s interest in Westernization places him closer to Marx than Stalin is. [Recall that New Hopes for a Changing World was written while Stalin was alive.] Lenin did not possess an outstanding intellect, but his commitment and determination was formidable. He somehow managed, starting from meager resources, to secure power in a largely defeated, almost non-functioning Russia. But this unlikely securing of power was based on force (following the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly), and force has been the cornerstone of Bolshevik legitimacy, as it were, ever since.
Russian fanaticism is longstanding. Stalin’s Russia – where communism and patriotism are largely intertwined – has spread communism quite widely, with perhaps more gains yet to come. “No success since the rise of Islam has been so rapid or so astonishing as the success of Communism [p. 121].” Not long ago, Fascism was almost as successful, and we might see a rebirth of that ideology, too, especially if the US were to return to 1920’s-style economic policies.
When a state is controlled by fanatics it becomes an unreliable partner for cooperation. Voluntary movement to a world government therefore will be aided by a reduction of communist fanaticism, and by a reduction of fanatic anti-communism, too.
“The essence of fanaticism consists in regarding some one matter as so important as to outweigh everything else [p. 121].” A current example is the unwillingness by some Americans to employ nuclear scientists who have distant, weak ties to communism. On both sides of the cold war are those who would rather see humanity exterminated rather than cooperate with the rival side.
Some fanaticisms, either from the nature of the beliefs or the small number of adherents, are not socially costly, such as the Amish prohibition on buttons. Most fanaticisms, including that of the Nazis, have their origins in difficult times, which prime the population to accept the fanatic claims. Tsarist oppression (including the execution of Lenin’s brother), combined with the suffering of military defeat, helped to stoke Bolshevism.
“To cure fanaticism, except as a rare aberration of eccentric individuals, three things are needed: security, prosperity and a liberal education [p. 123].” All three of these necessities are lacking today. The appeal of fanaticism in part draws from the lack of security that currently accompanies the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Russia is not economically developed – the west should seek to trade with Russia, to promote its prosperity. And Russia is a fierce opponent to liberal education, while America draws back from liberalism, too. “Consider the case of Dr. Lattimore, who was accused of being a traitor for saying things about China which every well-informed person knew to be true, and which it was to America’s interest to have known by those who make American policy [p. 124].”
Statesmen must address the problem of insecurity, in part by explaining the intolerable costs of future conflict. Scientists and others in the West should gather, without endorsing communism or capitalism, to make clear the horrors of modern war (even for the so-called winning side), and to indicate that cooperation among the cold war rivals is possible. (Recall Bertie’s faith in the reasonableness of philosophers in global politics, as expressed in Portraits From Memory.) Removing the fear of war would help to liberalize Russia and to increase toleration in the US.
World government is the goal, and though it will take half a century, the barriers put in its way by population, race, and creed can be surmounted. If we can muddle through while maintaining peace, eventually “mankind may enter upon a period of prosperity and well-being without parallel in the past history of our species [p. 125]” – not Bertie’s only vision of a future golden age.
Ideologies compete with (and sometimes complement) race and economic interests as sources of division. Differing ideologies can co-exist peacefully, unless extreme intolerance also is involved. Ancient religions didn’t require exclusivity – and hence intolerance of infidels – but Judaism changed that, and was followed in that practice by Christianity. After the Roman Empire adopted Christianity, intolerance not only was instituted for non-Christians, but also for the wrong species of Christian. When Islam developed, the intolerance on both the Christian and the Muslim sides led to war.
The religious strife of the Middle Ages became even more bloody in the 16th and 17th centuries. “At length, in view of the inconclusiveness of the struggle, a few enlightened nations, led by the Dutch, discovered that it was possible for Protestants and Catholics to live peaceably side by side [p. 113].” The French Revolution allowed Catholic countries to substitute political for religious strife.
The notion that “Western values” include religious toleration does not comport with the historical record: Europe actually was less tolerant than other continents. The Western intolerance only subsided when neither side could be extirpated.
The century of comparative European peace starting in 1815 ended abruptly in 1914. Those of Russell’s generation thought that the progress of the nineteenth century was the template for the future – instead of being a brief respite from darkness. “The practice of toleration, liberty and enlightenment had spread with astonishing rapidity [p. 114].” With hindsight, we can see the gathering storms, but the onset of World War I met with a mentally unprepared Europe; as a result, nations piled blunder upon blunder.
In the two centuries up to 1914, there have been times where fanatics held the reins, but generally these were brief intervals, even during the French Revolution. The post-World War I era has seen a much greater degree of fanaticism in power, and not only from Russia’s Bolsheviks. The competing fanaticisms, including the Cold War version, make it impossible to move in concert to a world government.
Soviet fanaticism derives from Marx and from Russian history. Pre-Marx socialists tended to be benevolent humanists. Marx had no use for what he thought of as their utopian schemes. His rather deterministic doctrine even marginalized the need to persuade opponents. His system in practice involved hatred of the bourgeoisie, though they were, again by his lights, only playing their own historical role – a sort of class-based predestination not unlike Calvin’s. “Naturally the propertied classes, wherever his creed spread, were terrified into violent reaction, and the vague good-natured liberalism of the middle nineteenth century gave way to a blacker and fiercer outlook [pages 116-117].”
The Marxian message found an appreciative audience among those who would prosper when the existing order is overturned. But as ordinary workers experienced improved living conditions in advanced countries, Marxism held less appeal. Hence it was in Russia, not in a highly developed capitalist nation, that Marxists took control, despite the relatively tiny Russian proletariat.
Bertie relates that he personally knew Bebel and Liebknecht, and found them to be gentle humanitarians. In these German communists, as well as in other radicals of the late nineteenth century, the cruelty that became pronounced in Bolshevik communism was not visible.
Lenin’s interest in Westernization places him closer to Marx than Stalin is. [Recall that New Hopes for a Changing World was written while Stalin was alive.] Lenin did not possess an outstanding intellect, but his commitment and determination was formidable. He somehow managed, starting from meager resources, to secure power in a largely defeated, almost non-functioning Russia. But this unlikely securing of power was based on force (following the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly), and force has been the cornerstone of Bolshevik legitimacy, as it were, ever since.
Russian fanaticism is longstanding. Stalin’s Russia – where communism and patriotism are largely intertwined – has spread communism quite widely, with perhaps more gains yet to come. “No success since the rise of Islam has been so rapid or so astonishing as the success of Communism [p. 121].” Not long ago, Fascism was almost as successful, and we might see a rebirth of that ideology, too, especially if the US were to return to 1920’s-style economic policies.
When a state is controlled by fanatics it becomes an unreliable partner for cooperation. Voluntary movement to a world government therefore will be aided by a reduction of communist fanaticism, and by a reduction of fanatic anti-communism, too.
“The essence of fanaticism consists in regarding some one matter as so important as to outweigh everything else [p. 121].” A current example is the unwillingness by some Americans to employ nuclear scientists who have distant, weak ties to communism. On both sides of the cold war are those who would rather see humanity exterminated rather than cooperate with the rival side.
Some fanaticisms, either from the nature of the beliefs or the small number of adherents, are not socially costly, such as the Amish prohibition on buttons. Most fanaticisms, including that of the Nazis, have their origins in difficult times, which prime the population to accept the fanatic claims. Tsarist oppression (including the execution of Lenin’s brother), combined with the suffering of military defeat, helped to stoke Bolshevism.
“To cure fanaticism, except as a rare aberration of eccentric individuals, three things are needed: security, prosperity and a liberal education [p. 123].” All three of these necessities are lacking today. The appeal of fanaticism in part draws from the lack of security that currently accompanies the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Russia is not economically developed – the west should seek to trade with Russia, to promote its prosperity. And Russia is a fierce opponent to liberal education, while America draws back from liberalism, too. “Consider the case of Dr. Lattimore, who was accused of being a traitor for saying things about China which every well-informed person knew to be true, and which it was to America’s interest to have known by those who make American policy [p. 124].”
Statesmen must address the problem of insecurity, in part by explaining the intolerable costs of future conflict. Scientists and others in the West should gather, without endorsing communism or capitalism, to make clear the horrors of modern war (even for the so-called winning side), and to indicate that cooperation among the cold war rivals is possible. (Recall Bertie’s faith in the reasonableness of philosophers in global politics, as expressed in Portraits From Memory.) Removing the fear of war would help to liberalize Russia and to increase toleration in the US.
World government is the goal, and though it will take half a century, the barriers put in its way by population, race, and creed can be surmounted. If we can muddle through while maintaining peace, eventually “mankind may enter upon a period of prosperity and well-being without parallel in the past history of our species [p. 125]” – not Bertie’s only vision of a future golden age.
Sunday, July 21, 2013
New Hopes for a Changing World, Chapter Twelve
“Racial Antagonism,” pages 96-110
The times have changed enough since 1951 that this chapter on race is a little unsettling today – though not as unsettling as Russell’s writings during the eugenics era.
The English and French spent most of 750 years at each other's throats, but they didn’t have an inherent dislike for each other. Americans descended from the English, however, have generally been quite contemptuous of Native Americans. This sort of hostility, rooted in biological differences [Russell claims], is the subject of this chapter. Russell also thinks that in terms of numbers and biological differences, the important racial divisions are between “the whites, the Mongolians, and the Negroes [p. 97].” Later (p. 98), when he is providing rough statistics on the global population by race, Russell notes that people in India don’t fit neatly within these racial divisions.
Russell praises the Russians for being less insolent towards other races than are most white people. Partly as a result, non-white people tend to be politically more friendly with Russia than with the English-speaking (predominantly) white countries.
The horrors of the enslavement of Negroes are well known, and profound injustice towards Negroes long has outlived slavery. As conditions have improved for Negroes in the US, they have deteriorated for blacks subject to white rule in Africa, with King Leopold II being a shocking example. South Africa, previously more humane, is now engaged in behavior that seems designed to build sentiment favorable to Russia among blacks. Leopold and the torturers of South Africa proclaim fervent Christianity.
Southern Europeans can be as cruel towards blacks as are Northern Europeans, but they don’t seem to hold the same racial animus. There is no evidence for the frequent suggestion of some Nordic-type whites that racially mixed offspring are biologically disadvantaged.
White southerners express great confusion towards black people, claiming they find them physically repulsive but wanting to use them as servants. What they really can’t abide is equality and justice for blacks. But is there an instinctive basis for the views of whites?
If Chinese and Japanese were allowed to immigrate to “white” countries, their work habits would soon make them dominate the labor market. The threat that this would happen led the American and Australian democracies to limit immigration from Asia. A world democracy, alternatively, would welcome open borders. [Russell writes, somewhat enigmatically: “Those who hold – as I certainly do – that it would be regrettable if California and Australia ceased to be white men’s countries, must seek some principle other than democracy to justify their position [pages 100-101].” Russell doesn’t provide such a principle. What would Russell make of the fact that non-Hispanic whites now form less than 40% of the population of California?] In some parts of Asia, the Chinese population faces the sort of antipathy that Jews face throughout much of the world.
The awful prejudice against Jews started as religious, but economic motives then joined in. The eventual Nazi hatred of Jews was divorced from religion.
If we examine the current antagonism many Gentiles feel towards Jews, we will hear various charges of sharp business practices and whatnot. But in fact, it is the aversion that comes first, and the charges are developed to justify the aversion. Some of the dislike itself is based on the success of Jews – how to explain losing out to them, unless they competed unfairly?
Other groups (such as Quakers) are successful in business, without meeting with the same aversion. It is the fear of the strange that underlies the hatred against Jews, and underlies racial prejudice more generally. In other words, cowardice stokes prejudices: “If Hitler had been a brave man he would not have been an anti-Semite [p. 104].”
Skin color as a basis for bigotry seems to be rather modern. Russell offers an analysis of Othello in which the social problem of the Othello-Desdemona pairing draws more from class distinctions than from racial ones. “No one objected to Pocahontas as a white man’s wife; on the contrary, she was treated with honor [p. 104].” The instinct for racial prejudice probably draws not only from ideas of stranger danger, but also from the fear of being dominated by the other – a fear that all slave-owning societies face.
The instinctual basis for racial hatred is but a small part of the story, and one that can easily be re-written by exposure and acclimation. Other elements are more durable: differing habits engendering a view of our own race’s superiority, envy at the success of others, or condemnation of their work habits if they are not successful. Further, we are all descendants of those who survived countless wars, so the search for someone to hate is ingrained – racial differences can fill that void. But now wars against the hated others bring disaster to all participants.
Feelings of both superiority and inferiority fuel racial tensions. People like to think well of themselves, and hence tend to disparage groups – including genders and nationalities – that they are not part of. Feeling superior licenses a certain condescending goodwill to others – but then fears of inferiority darken one’s views. When the subjugated (including women and slaves) become willing to protest their treatment, the oppressors respond with hatred.
Some racial hatred reflects a sort of self-interest, but the US domestic version is in no one’s interest. The dislike of poor foreign immigrants might be in a nation’s economic self-interest, however. “Hostility to Jews is wholly irrational [p. 106]”; it undermined Spain and destroyed Germany.
All in all, the best solution to avoiding the problems of racial hatred is equality – as opposed to a species of apartheid or a caste system, for instance. “Some way must be found by which Jews and Gentiles, Negroes and white men, can live peaceably side by side in one community [pages 107-108].” The equality should include intermarriage – there is no biological rationale for separating the races. Advantages to racial purity are lacking in the historical record; the evidence that does exist rather seems on the side of impurity. Keeping economically disparate races geographically separate (by limiting immigration) where they already are separated can keep the peace, perhaps, while living standards are raised in the relatively less developed nation. But where races already intermingle, full equality is the best policy.
“Racial antagonism is an illiberal and irrational heritage from our animal past [p. 109].” This antagonism must be extirpated if any human races are to survive into the next century. Governments declare wars, but they are goaded by widespread hatreds in the populace – hatreds that provide a seeming rationale for war. So we must rid our hearts of these hatreds, or pay a massive price.
The times have changed enough since 1951 that this chapter on race is a little unsettling today – though not as unsettling as Russell’s writings during the eugenics era.
The English and French spent most of 750 years at each other's throats, but they didn’t have an inherent dislike for each other. Americans descended from the English, however, have generally been quite contemptuous of Native Americans. This sort of hostility, rooted in biological differences [Russell claims], is the subject of this chapter. Russell also thinks that in terms of numbers and biological differences, the important racial divisions are between “the whites, the Mongolians, and the Negroes [p. 97].” Later (p. 98), when he is providing rough statistics on the global population by race, Russell notes that people in India don’t fit neatly within these racial divisions.
Russell praises the Russians for being less insolent towards other races than are most white people. Partly as a result, non-white people tend to be politically more friendly with Russia than with the English-speaking (predominantly) white countries.
The horrors of the enslavement of Negroes are well known, and profound injustice towards Negroes long has outlived slavery. As conditions have improved for Negroes in the US, they have deteriorated for blacks subject to white rule in Africa, with King Leopold II being a shocking example. South Africa, previously more humane, is now engaged in behavior that seems designed to build sentiment favorable to Russia among blacks. Leopold and the torturers of South Africa proclaim fervent Christianity.
Southern Europeans can be as cruel towards blacks as are Northern Europeans, but they don’t seem to hold the same racial animus. There is no evidence for the frequent suggestion of some Nordic-type whites that racially mixed offspring are biologically disadvantaged.
White southerners express great confusion towards black people, claiming they find them physically repulsive but wanting to use them as servants. What they really can’t abide is equality and justice for blacks. But is there an instinctive basis for the views of whites?
If Chinese and Japanese were allowed to immigrate to “white” countries, their work habits would soon make them dominate the labor market. The threat that this would happen led the American and Australian democracies to limit immigration from Asia. A world democracy, alternatively, would welcome open borders. [Russell writes, somewhat enigmatically: “Those who hold – as I certainly do – that it would be regrettable if California and Australia ceased to be white men’s countries, must seek some principle other than democracy to justify their position [pages 100-101].” Russell doesn’t provide such a principle. What would Russell make of the fact that non-Hispanic whites now form less than 40% of the population of California?] In some parts of Asia, the Chinese population faces the sort of antipathy that Jews face throughout much of the world.
The awful prejudice against Jews started as religious, but economic motives then joined in. The eventual Nazi hatred of Jews was divorced from religion.
If we examine the current antagonism many Gentiles feel towards Jews, we will hear various charges of sharp business practices and whatnot. But in fact, it is the aversion that comes first, and the charges are developed to justify the aversion. Some of the dislike itself is based on the success of Jews – how to explain losing out to them, unless they competed unfairly?
Other groups (such as Quakers) are successful in business, without meeting with the same aversion. It is the fear of the strange that underlies the hatred against Jews, and underlies racial prejudice more generally. In other words, cowardice stokes prejudices: “If Hitler had been a brave man he would not have been an anti-Semite [p. 104].”
Skin color as a basis for bigotry seems to be rather modern. Russell offers an analysis of Othello in which the social problem of the Othello-Desdemona pairing draws more from class distinctions than from racial ones. “No one objected to Pocahontas as a white man’s wife; on the contrary, she was treated with honor [p. 104].” The instinct for racial prejudice probably draws not only from ideas of stranger danger, but also from the fear of being dominated by the other – a fear that all slave-owning societies face.
The instinctual basis for racial hatred is but a small part of the story, and one that can easily be re-written by exposure and acclimation. Other elements are more durable: differing habits engendering a view of our own race’s superiority, envy at the success of others, or condemnation of their work habits if they are not successful. Further, we are all descendants of those who survived countless wars, so the search for someone to hate is ingrained – racial differences can fill that void. But now wars against the hated others bring disaster to all participants.
Feelings of both superiority and inferiority fuel racial tensions. People like to think well of themselves, and hence tend to disparage groups – including genders and nationalities – that they are not part of. Feeling superior licenses a certain condescending goodwill to others – but then fears of inferiority darken one’s views. When the subjugated (including women and slaves) become willing to protest their treatment, the oppressors respond with hatred.
Some racial hatred reflects a sort of self-interest, but the US domestic version is in no one’s interest. The dislike of poor foreign immigrants might be in a nation’s economic self-interest, however. “Hostility to Jews is wholly irrational [p. 106]”; it undermined Spain and destroyed Germany.
All in all, the best solution to avoiding the problems of racial hatred is equality – as opposed to a species of apartheid or a caste system, for instance. “Some way must be found by which Jews and Gentiles, Negroes and white men, can live peaceably side by side in one community [pages 107-108].” The equality should include intermarriage – there is no biological rationale for separating the races. Advantages to racial purity are lacking in the historical record; the evidence that does exist rather seems on the side of impurity. Keeping economically disparate races geographically separate (by limiting immigration) where they already are separated can keep the peace, perhaps, while living standards are raised in the relatively less developed nation. But where races already intermingle, full equality is the best policy.
“Racial antagonism is an illiberal and irrational heritage from our animal past [p. 109].” This antagonism must be extirpated if any human races are to survive into the next century. Governments declare wars, but they are goaded by widespread hatreds in the populace – hatreds that provide a seeming rationale for war. So we must rid our hearts of these hatreds, or pay a massive price.
Sunday, June 2, 2013
New Hopes for a Changing World, Chapter Eleven
“World Government,” pages 89-95
Industrial and agriculture societies need each other, just like the butcher and the baker need each other. So it would seem that doux commerce should reign – except that trade is now generally managed by governments: “…if the butcher is one sovereign State and the baker is another, if the number of loaves that the butcher can exchange for his joints depends upon his skill with the revolver, it is possible that the baker may cease to regard him with ardent affection [p. 89].” So economic interdependence, mediated not through the market but through nation-states, causes strife, not fellow-feeling. Politics is the master – and contra Marx, politics itself is not determined by economics. Marx did not understand that impoverishing others is more important to many people than enriching themselves.
The advantages of large size are most apparent in war, and war has served to expand social units, up to nations and combinations of nations. War used to offer profits to victors, but now it has become too expensive. (As a percentage of the population, war was often more costly in the past, when disease deaths are considered along with battle deaths.) “The population of Japan increased by about five millions during the Second World War, whereas it is estimated that during the Thirty Years’ War the population of Germany was halved [p. 91].” But the radioactivity of atomic weapons might wipe out all life on earth, though we can’t be sure until it is too late.
Ages when defensive forces have the upper hand over offensive forces tend to be happy ages. We have to worry that technological advance might give a considerable advantage to offense, perhaps through biological weapons. Modern wars also put more of the civilian population at risk, diminishing the attractiveness of urban life. “I am an old man, and I can remember a time when it was not thought quite the thing to make war on women and children; but that happy age is past [p. 92].”
All in all, war is more of a menace now than it has been in the past. The prevention of war, therefore, takes on paramount importance, and justifies thinking about massive political reforms. Simply continuing with our present nation-state system will, with high likelihood, bring what it has always brought, war. So a global sovereign power, one possessing a monopoly on the most lethal weapons, is required.
How would such a world authority work? Besides its monopoly control of advanced weaponry, it must command the loyalty of troops. Inter-national disputes must be submitted to its jurisdiction, and any unsanctioned military offensive will make the aggressor nation a pariah, and subject to armed retaliation from the global forces. Various judicial and legislative powers will evolve naturally in the wake of the requisite military authority.
The world government may well not be democratic, and it may be foisted on some nations unwillingly. [Russell made a similar point in Unpopular Essays.] Humanity is probably too politically immature to achieve world government in a wholly consensual manner. Over time, defeated powers can join the winning partnership. But for stability to reign, the great conflictual issues of race, population, and creed will have to be defused. “It will be impossible to feel that the world is in a satisfactory state until there is a certain degree of equality, and a certain acquiescence everywhere in the power of the world Government, and this will not be possible until the poorer nations of the world have become educated, modernized in their technique, and more or less stationary in population [pages 94-95].” Western progress in the past half-century shows that this pleasant prospect is not a pipedream.
The chain of logic leads to the conclusion that a stable global government can only exist if the major countries are not under population pressure. Today’s leading nations have reduced infant mortality, enlarged lifespans, and improved living standards. Their success provides a template for poorer nations. So the conclusion is one of hope: men at this time are masters of their fate. They possess the means to achieve a better world.
Industrial and agriculture societies need each other, just like the butcher and the baker need each other. So it would seem that doux commerce should reign – except that trade is now generally managed by governments: “…if the butcher is one sovereign State and the baker is another, if the number of loaves that the butcher can exchange for his joints depends upon his skill with the revolver, it is possible that the baker may cease to regard him with ardent affection [p. 89].” So economic interdependence, mediated not through the market but through nation-states, causes strife, not fellow-feeling. Politics is the master – and contra Marx, politics itself is not determined by economics. Marx did not understand that impoverishing others is more important to many people than enriching themselves.
The advantages of large size are most apparent in war, and war has served to expand social units, up to nations and combinations of nations. War used to offer profits to victors, but now it has become too expensive. (As a percentage of the population, war was often more costly in the past, when disease deaths are considered along with battle deaths.) “The population of Japan increased by about five millions during the Second World War, whereas it is estimated that during the Thirty Years’ War the population of Germany was halved [p. 91].” But the radioactivity of atomic weapons might wipe out all life on earth, though we can’t be sure until it is too late.
Ages when defensive forces have the upper hand over offensive forces tend to be happy ages. We have to worry that technological advance might give a considerable advantage to offense, perhaps through biological weapons. Modern wars also put more of the civilian population at risk, diminishing the attractiveness of urban life. “I am an old man, and I can remember a time when it was not thought quite the thing to make war on women and children; but that happy age is past [p. 92].”
All in all, war is more of a menace now than it has been in the past. The prevention of war, therefore, takes on paramount importance, and justifies thinking about massive political reforms. Simply continuing with our present nation-state system will, with high likelihood, bring what it has always brought, war. So a global sovereign power, one possessing a monopoly on the most lethal weapons, is required.
How would such a world authority work? Besides its monopoly control of advanced weaponry, it must command the loyalty of troops. Inter-national disputes must be submitted to its jurisdiction, and any unsanctioned military offensive will make the aggressor nation a pariah, and subject to armed retaliation from the global forces. Various judicial and legislative powers will evolve naturally in the wake of the requisite military authority.
The world government may well not be democratic, and it may be foisted on some nations unwillingly. [Russell made a similar point in Unpopular Essays.] Humanity is probably too politically immature to achieve world government in a wholly consensual manner. Over time, defeated powers can join the winning partnership. But for stability to reign, the great conflictual issues of race, population, and creed will have to be defused. “It will be impossible to feel that the world is in a satisfactory state until there is a certain degree of equality, and a certain acquiescence everywhere in the power of the world Government, and this will not be possible until the poorer nations of the world have become educated, modernized in their technique, and more or less stationary in population [pages 94-95].” Western progress in the past half-century shows that this pleasant prospect is not a pipedream.
The chain of logic leads to the conclusion that a stable global government can only exist if the major countries are not under population pressure. Today’s leading nations have reduced infant mortality, enlarged lifespans, and improved living standards. Their success provides a template for poorer nations. So the conclusion is one of hope: men at this time are masters of their fate. They possess the means to achieve a better world.
Sunday, April 21, 2013
New Hopes for a Changing World, Chapter Ten
“Conflicts of Manners of Life,” pages 83-88
New techniques, like agriculture once was, always come into conflict with traditional ways of life, with wars the likely result. The people of the old ways, the nomads or barbarians, frequently possess superior military prowess. As a ruling minority, however, they tend to become assimilated into the ways of civilization. “Kublai Khan, although his grandfather had been a ruffianly barbarian, was a man of the highest culture, quite capable of stately pleasure domes and the rest of it [p. 84].” Even if a new technique such as agriculture is militarily inferior, its economic efficiency causes it to spread, so conquest by nomads does not lead to a proliferation of nomads.
In the past, a major problem for civilized communities was to maintain the warlike resolution necessary to keep the invaders at bay. The military advantage recently has shifted away from the nomads, though, and perhaps an optimistic view would hold that the atomic bomb helps to secure the rich, civilized portions of the globe.
Seafaring and land-based cultures also have been historical military rivals. The seafarers, whether Norsemen, Venetian, or British, often have had the upper hand. They, too, tend to evolve from pirates into merchants, while seafaring in general has spread civilization. Seafaring exposes one to the ways of other cultures, promoting a cosmopolitanism that helps to combat bigotry. Traders rely on mutually advantageous exchange, and so they develop the habit of looking at situations from the point of view of others. This civilizing feature of maritime trade is countered by the close relationship between the merchant marine and piracy, which allows sea power to inculcate imperialism. Voluntary trade can become coerced trade, as the Opium War demonstrates.
Today’s clash of techniques is between industrial production and traditional agriculture. In geopolitical terms, the clash pits Europe and the US against a Russian-led Asia. The agricultural workers in Russia, India, and China are barely at subsistence. Those who succumb to the siren song of communism will soon find police and spies weighing them down, instead of gaining the freedom that they seek. “And if the Soviet system is neither softened nor overthrown, they may suffer centuries of impoverished serfdom [p. 88].” Agricultural societies will eventually give way to industrialized societies – even agriculture is industrial in developed countries. We can hope that the current clash of industry and agriculture will not involve the long periods of strife that characterized the conflicts between nomads and agriculturalists, and between land-based and seafaring societies.
New techniques, like agriculture once was, always come into conflict with traditional ways of life, with wars the likely result. The people of the old ways, the nomads or barbarians, frequently possess superior military prowess. As a ruling minority, however, they tend to become assimilated into the ways of civilization. “Kublai Khan, although his grandfather had been a ruffianly barbarian, was a man of the highest culture, quite capable of stately pleasure domes and the rest of it [p. 84].” Even if a new technique such as agriculture is militarily inferior, its economic efficiency causes it to spread, so conquest by nomads does not lead to a proliferation of nomads.
In the past, a major problem for civilized communities was to maintain the warlike resolution necessary to keep the invaders at bay. The military advantage recently has shifted away from the nomads, though, and perhaps an optimistic view would hold that the atomic bomb helps to secure the rich, civilized portions of the globe.
Seafaring and land-based cultures also have been historical military rivals. The seafarers, whether Norsemen, Venetian, or British, often have had the upper hand. They, too, tend to evolve from pirates into merchants, while seafaring in general has spread civilization. Seafaring exposes one to the ways of other cultures, promoting a cosmopolitanism that helps to combat bigotry. Traders rely on mutually advantageous exchange, and so they develop the habit of looking at situations from the point of view of others. This civilizing feature of maritime trade is countered by the close relationship between the merchant marine and piracy, which allows sea power to inculcate imperialism. Voluntary trade can become coerced trade, as the Opium War demonstrates.
Today’s clash of techniques is between industrial production and traditional agriculture. In geopolitical terms, the clash pits Europe and the US against a Russian-led Asia. The agricultural workers in Russia, India, and China are barely at subsistence. Those who succumb to the siren song of communism will soon find police and spies weighing them down, instead of gaining the freedom that they seek. “And if the Soviet system is neither softened nor overthrown, they may suffer centuries of impoverished serfdom [p. 88].” Agricultural societies will eventually give way to industrialized societies – even agriculture is industrial in developed countries. We can hope that the current clash of industry and agriculture will not involve the long periods of strife that characterized the conflicts between nomads and agriculturalists, and between land-based and seafaring societies.
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