Chapter 7 (pages 78-92): “The Liberation of Women”
The ongoing transition in sexual mores primarily derives from the invention of contraceptives and the emancipation of women. Freedom for women is part of the movement towards democracy, and can be traced from the French Revolution through Mary Wollstonecraft to John Stuart Mill. [So Russell has gotten around to bringing up, here, Mill’s Subjection of Women.] Russell tells a personal anecdote: his parents were disciples of Mill and committed to the emancipation of women. Russell’s birth was overseen (through his mother’s choice) by “the first woman doctor [p. 79],” who was not allowed to be fully certified. The feminist movement of his parents’ generation did not get very far with the right to vote, but they succeeded in passing the Married Women’s Property Act of 1882, which allowed married women (and not their husbands) to control their own property. The rapid acquisition of political rights by women in advanced countries is unprecedented, though it is paralleled by the abolition of slavery: “but after all slavery did not exist in European countries in modern times, and did not concern anything so intimate as the relations of men and women [p. 80].”
The rapid advance of women can be traced to the near impossibility of reconciling democracy with their subjection, and to the increased numbers of women (particularly during the war [WWI -- RBR]) earning money outside the home. Prior to the war, an argument aimed at keeping women from voting was that they would tend to be pacifists, but their contributions to the war cause (“their share in the bloody work [p. 81]”) put the lie to this. Those who hoped that securing the right to vote for women would improve the moral tone of political life had their hopes dashed: “it seems to be the fate of idealists to obtain what they have struggled for in a form which destroys their ideals [p. 81].” But the real case for women’s right to vote had nothing to do with any “peculiar merits” of women in the first place.
But here, Russell says, he is concerned with the social emancipation of women, not their political emancipation. Previously (and still in the East), women’s virtue was secured via seclusion. In the West, alternatively, they have been propagandized from childhood to abhor non-marital sex. The mental barriers were thought to substitute for physical ones. “The women of the Victorian age were, and a great many women still are, in a mental prison [p. 83].” But recently there has been a “reappearance in consciousness of instinctive desires which had been buried beneath mountains of prudery [p. 83].” Most champions of women’s rights were themselves “rigid moralists,” who sought to impose upon men the controls heretofore placed only upon women.
Things have changed since about 1914. “The motives of female virtue in the past were chiefly the fear of hell-fire and the fear of pregnancy; the one was removed by the decay of theological orthodoxy, the other by contraceptives [p. 84].” Now feminists seek equality with men in moral freedom, not (by restraining male ‘vices’) in moral slavery.
The young have this new morality, and most of the old are unaware of it. This situation is unstable. In some places, the old will successfully suppress the changes, and in others, the young will get the upper hand as they succeed to the positions of power, thereby cementing the changed morality.
Men have always been allowed, as a practical matter, to engage in non-marital sex, and this cannot change, no matter what the moralists say. So the moralists must either permit young unmarried men to have sex with prostitutes, or with unmarried women of their own class. But the latter is anathema to moralists, who are (again, in practice) committed to the double standard whereby sex by males outside of marriage is no big deal but terribly bad for women. So moralists, in effect, support male sex with prostitutes. “Moralists, of course, do not think out the consequences of advocating a morality which they know will not be obeyed; they think that so long as they do not advocate prostitution they are not responsible for the fact that prostitution is the inevitable outcome of their teaching [p.87].” Russell goes on to say that this reasoning is more evidence that professional moralists are a bit dim.
Equality between the sexes therefore requires tolerance of non-marital sex, and indeed, in places with more adult women than men, it also is required to prevent some women from being “wholly debarred from sexual experience [p. 88].”
But without female chastity and wifely faithfulness, how to safeguard the family or perhaps, instead, to “acquiesce in the breakup of the family?” One solution is that procreative sex could be limited to being within marriages, with husbands tolerating their wives’ non-procreative affairs. “The difficulty of such a scheme as yet is that it requires us to place more reliance on the efficacy of contraceptives and the truthfulness of wives than seems rational; this difficulty may, however, be diminished before long [p. 89; Russell anticipates DNA testing and the pill! -- RBR].” Alternatively, the institution of fatherhood could decay, and the state could step partly into the role. All kids would be like illegitimate kids are now, but the government would see to their upbringing more attentively.
But what if the goal is to re-establish the old morality? Then girls must be kept uneducated, superstitious, and stupid, as occurs in schools controlled by churches, and sex information must be censored. But these alone will not suffice without secluding girls. For instance, they can’t be allowed to work outside the home or to own a car. Perhaps the virginity of unmarried women can be checked monthly by “police doctors [p. 91]”, and further heavy-handed measures, conducted for a century, might “do something to stem the rising tide of immorality [p. 91].” But probably even this won’t suffice, and the moralists should require that all non-clergy males be castrated. (Russell suggests in a footnote that he might remove the exception for the clergy now that he has read Elmer Gantry.)
Either restoring the old morality, or allowing the new morality to grow without restraint, poses severe problems. So “we shall need a genuinely new morality [p. 92],” and the remainder of the book hopes to contribute to pointing the way.
Sunday, September 16, 2007
Saturday, September 15, 2007
Marriage and Morals, Chapter 6
Chapter 6 (pages 63-77): "Romantic Love"
Brutality marked the relations between the sexes during the Dark Ages. As the doctrine of clerical celibacy took hold, their now sinful relationships with women became more depraved.
The notion of romantic love was contributed by the laity, not by the Church. This notion is that the beloved is both precious and hard to win over; all sorts of feats are required to conquer her. Russell follows many moralists (surprisingly, at least to me), when he suggests that the high value placed on the lady is the result of the difficulty of obtaining her: “when a man has no difficulty in obtaining a woman, his feeling towards her does not take the form of romantic love [p. 66].” At first, romantic love was directed at unobtainable “women of the highest respectability…[p. 66].” The Church had made sex so disreputable that high sentiments could only be nurtured towards women who were not available sexually. It is hard for moderns to grasp the sort of transcendent emotion that applied only to the unattainable, as only such women were worthy of it, being removed from the defilement of sex. But this emotion produced Dante and other excellent literature. It didn’t quite take in France and Burgundy, however, where the “Romaunt of the Rose” allowed the satisfaction of knightly courtship. The knightly love of the “Rose” was reserved for aristocrats, however, who were somewhat exempt from ecclesiastical strictures. “In our democratic age we are apt to forget what the world has owed at various times to aristocracies [p. 70]”; so writes the grandson of Lord Russell.
Renaissance romantic love was non-platonic but still poetic, with the poetry employed in wooing. “From the point of view of the arts, it is certainly regrettable when women are too accessible; what is most to be desired is that they should be difficult but not impossible of access [p. 72].” The romantic era, as personified by Shelley, saw the peak of romantic love, but even Shelley’s efforts were stimulated by the “social barriers” (p. 73) placed in his path to women.
But the love is more important than the poetry. “I believe myself that romantic love is the source of the most intense delights that life has to offer [p. 74].” (There will be much more praise of love in Chapter 9.) People should have the opportunity to experience this joy, though romantic love should not be the “main purpose” of life.
The idea “that marriage should be the outcome of romantic love [pp. 74-75]” is of recent vintage. And it is not clear that having people marry for romance – instead of, say, having parents make matches for other reasons – has been an unbridled success. Romantic views of marriage are common in the United States, “where law and custom alike are based upon the dreams of spinsters [pp. 75-76],” but the end product has been substantial divorce and a paucity of happy marriages.
Marriage transcends the pleasure of the parties, in part by producing children. Russell thinks that it is desirable that romantic love motivate marriages, but romantic visions are inaccurate. Most happy marriages require “an affectionate intimacy quite unmixed with illusion [p. 77].” And children really are key, because if it were not for them, “there would be no need of any institution concerned with sex…[p. 77].” With kids on the scene, the feelings of a husband and wife “towards each other are no longer what is of most importance [p. 77].” Again, these sentiments are re-iterated in Chapter 9.
Brutality marked the relations between the sexes during the Dark Ages. As the doctrine of clerical celibacy took hold, their now sinful relationships with women became more depraved.
The notion of romantic love was contributed by the laity, not by the Church. This notion is that the beloved is both precious and hard to win over; all sorts of feats are required to conquer her. Russell follows many moralists (surprisingly, at least to me), when he suggests that the high value placed on the lady is the result of the difficulty of obtaining her: “when a man has no difficulty in obtaining a woman, his feeling towards her does not take the form of romantic love [p. 66].” At first, romantic love was directed at unobtainable “women of the highest respectability…[p. 66].” The Church had made sex so disreputable that high sentiments could only be nurtured towards women who were not available sexually. It is hard for moderns to grasp the sort of transcendent emotion that applied only to the unattainable, as only such women were worthy of it, being removed from the defilement of sex. But this emotion produced Dante and other excellent literature. It didn’t quite take in France and Burgundy, however, where the “Romaunt of the Rose” allowed the satisfaction of knightly courtship. The knightly love of the “Rose” was reserved for aristocrats, however, who were somewhat exempt from ecclesiastical strictures. “In our democratic age we are apt to forget what the world has owed at various times to aristocracies [p. 70]”; so writes the grandson of Lord Russell.
Renaissance romantic love was non-platonic but still poetic, with the poetry employed in wooing. “From the point of view of the arts, it is certainly regrettable when women are too accessible; what is most to be desired is that they should be difficult but not impossible of access [p. 72].” The romantic era, as personified by Shelley, saw the peak of romantic love, but even Shelley’s efforts were stimulated by the “social barriers” (p. 73) placed in his path to women.
But the love is more important than the poetry. “I believe myself that romantic love is the source of the most intense delights that life has to offer [p. 74].” (There will be much more praise of love in Chapter 9.) People should have the opportunity to experience this joy, though romantic love should not be the “main purpose” of life.
The idea “that marriage should be the outcome of romantic love [pp. 74-75]” is of recent vintage. And it is not clear that having people marry for romance – instead of, say, having parents make matches for other reasons – has been an unbridled success. Romantic views of marriage are common in the United States, “where law and custom alike are based upon the dreams of spinsters [pp. 75-76],” but the end product has been substantial divorce and a paucity of happy marriages.
Marriage transcends the pleasure of the parties, in part by producing children. Russell thinks that it is desirable that romantic love motivate marriages, but romantic visions are inaccurate. Most happy marriages require “an affectionate intimacy quite unmixed with illusion [p. 77].” And children really are key, because if it were not for them, “there would be no need of any institution concerned with sex…[p. 77].” With kids on the scene, the feelings of a husband and wife “towards each other are no longer what is of most importance [p. 77].” Again, these sentiments are re-iterated in Chapter 9.
Friday, September 14, 2007
Marriage and Morals, Chapter 5
Chapter 5 (pages 44-62): “Christian Ethics”
St. Paul and Christianity presented a new approach to marriage, that it was necessary not for “the procreation of children, but to prevent the sin of fornication [p. 44].” Marriage for St. Paul was what would be called today -- i.e., 2007 -- a form of harm reduction, like methadone maintenance for heroin addicts: “it is better to marry than to burn.” [The passage is from First Corinthians vii. 9, quoted by Russell on page 45.] St. Paul “does not suggest for a moment that there may be any positive good in marriage…[p. 46]”; rather, he is concerned only with minimizing fornication. “It is just as if one were to maintain that the sole reason for baking bread is to prevent people from stealing cake [pp. 46-47].” But St. Paul doesn’t explain what is so bad about fornication. The wholesale condemnation of fornication – as opposed to the condemnation of adultery, i.e., sex with a married woman – was a Christian innovation. The condemnation of sex outside of marriage seems to be a byproduct of condemnation of all sex, even of the marital strain. “A view of this sort, which goes against biological facts, can only be regarded by sane people as a morbid aberration. The fact that it is embedded in Christian ethics has made Christianity throughout its whole history a force tending towards mental disorders and unwholesome views of life [p. 48].”
The Church even was anti-bathing, because anything that made the body more appealing was a temptation to sin. Lice were signs of holiness. “It is evident that, where such views concerning sex prevailed, sexual relations when they occurred would tend to be brutal and harsh, like drinking under Prohibition [p. 50].” Russell includes long passages (on pages 49-52) on the Church’s disparaging view of sex and marriage from W.E.H. Lecky’s “History of European Morals.”
The Catholic Church has taken Paul’s condemnation of sex still further, by making a sin even marital sex that is not intended for procreation. Marital sex that is intended for procreation, then, is justified, even if in other respects – for instance, it threatens the health of the mother – it is ill-advised or cruel. The Catholic approach is based upon St. Paul’s asceticism and a belief that births are good, since every person has a soul capable of salvation: “…the fact that souls are equally capable of damnation is not taken into account, and yet it seems quite as relevant [p. 53].” Catholic political influence makes it hard for Protestants to use birth control, but most of the Protestant children, by Catholic reckoning, will go to Hell.
Though children are the purpose of marital sex in Catholicism, the Church does not allow marriages to be ended on the basis of sterility. This shows that the greater factor underlying the constraints on sex is Pauline asceticism, and not procreation. Declaring marriage to be a sacrament covers up the Catholic low opinion of marriage, while also leading to much unhappiness as bad unions are virtually indissoluble, and remarriage disallowed.
Nevertheless, the Catholic church is fairly tolerant towards sin. This tolerance increased its power, as only priests could grant the absolution that would prevent eternal damnation.
Protestantism is more tolerant in theory, but in practice often less tolerant. Protestants are not as committed to celibacy, while often not regarding marriage as a sacrament and permitting divorce. “But Protestants were more shocked than Catholics by fornication, and altogether more rigid in their moral condemnations [p. 56].” Protestant sinners are worse off than Catholic sinners, lacking the institutions of confession and absolution.
Those educated in the Christian tradition (i.e., most of us), have a hard time viewing these matters neutrally, without prejudices inculcated by an intensive childhood exposure to religious teachings. What is really wrong with sex? The Church’s negative attitude “must be regarded as purely superstitious… [p. 57],” the product of “a diseased condition of body or mind, or both [pp. 57-58].”
“The fact that an opinion has been widely held is no evidence whatever that it is not utterly absurd; indeed in view of the silliness of the majority of mankind, a widespread belief is more likely to be foolish than sensible. The Pelew Islanders believe that the perforation of the nose is necessary for winning eternal bliss. Europeans think that this end is better attained by wetting the head while pronouncing certain words. The belief of the Pelew Islanders is a superstition; the belief of Europeans one of the truths of our holy religion [page 58, footnote omitted].”
Jeremy Bentham noted that concepts had different names, depending on whether the writer was hoping to praise, dispraise, or be neutral towards the concept. It would be best to avoid words like “fornication” and “adultery” that carry a negative connotation, as well as “gallantry,” which signals approval. But neutral terms – ‘extra-marital sexual relations [p. 59]’ – undermine graceful writing; nevertheless, they must be the dominant, though not exclusive, means of discourse on these matters. (On page 60, Russell notes the personal double standard, that what I do is “gallantry” and what you do is “fornication.” Recall also Byron's Don Juan: "What men call gallantry, and gods adultery,/ Is much more common where the climate 's sultry.")
“The Christian ethics inevitably, through the emphasis laid upon sexual virtue, did a great deal to degrade the position of women [p. 60].” Men did the writing, and women were temptresses. The temptresses had to have their opportunities to tempt restricted. “It is only in quite modern times that women have regained the degree of freedom which they enjoyed in the Roman Empire [pp. 60-61].” Their freedom was “curtailed under the pretence of protecting them from sin [p. 61].” Now that the notion of sin is crumbling, female freedom is increasing.
St. Paul and Christianity presented a new approach to marriage, that it was necessary not for “the procreation of children, but to prevent the sin of fornication [p. 44].” Marriage for St. Paul was what would be called today -- i.e., 2007 -- a form of harm reduction, like methadone maintenance for heroin addicts: “it is better to marry than to burn.” [The passage is from First Corinthians vii. 9, quoted by Russell on page 45.] St. Paul “does not suggest for a moment that there may be any positive good in marriage…[p. 46]”; rather, he is concerned only with minimizing fornication. “It is just as if one were to maintain that the sole reason for baking bread is to prevent people from stealing cake [pp. 46-47].” But St. Paul doesn’t explain what is so bad about fornication. The wholesale condemnation of fornication – as opposed to the condemnation of adultery, i.e., sex with a married woman – was a Christian innovation. The condemnation of sex outside of marriage seems to be a byproduct of condemnation of all sex, even of the marital strain. “A view of this sort, which goes against biological facts, can only be regarded by sane people as a morbid aberration. The fact that it is embedded in Christian ethics has made Christianity throughout its whole history a force tending towards mental disorders and unwholesome views of life [p. 48].”
The Church even was anti-bathing, because anything that made the body more appealing was a temptation to sin. Lice were signs of holiness. “It is evident that, where such views concerning sex prevailed, sexual relations when they occurred would tend to be brutal and harsh, like drinking under Prohibition [p. 50].” Russell includes long passages (on pages 49-52) on the Church’s disparaging view of sex and marriage from W.E.H. Lecky’s “History of European Morals.”
The Catholic Church has taken Paul’s condemnation of sex still further, by making a sin even marital sex that is not intended for procreation. Marital sex that is intended for procreation, then, is justified, even if in other respects – for instance, it threatens the health of the mother – it is ill-advised or cruel. The Catholic approach is based upon St. Paul’s asceticism and a belief that births are good, since every person has a soul capable of salvation: “…the fact that souls are equally capable of damnation is not taken into account, and yet it seems quite as relevant [p. 53].” Catholic political influence makes it hard for Protestants to use birth control, but most of the Protestant children, by Catholic reckoning, will go to Hell.
Though children are the purpose of marital sex in Catholicism, the Church does not allow marriages to be ended on the basis of sterility. This shows that the greater factor underlying the constraints on sex is Pauline asceticism, and not procreation. Declaring marriage to be a sacrament covers up the Catholic low opinion of marriage, while also leading to much unhappiness as bad unions are virtually indissoluble, and remarriage disallowed.
Nevertheless, the Catholic church is fairly tolerant towards sin. This tolerance increased its power, as only priests could grant the absolution that would prevent eternal damnation.
Protestantism is more tolerant in theory, but in practice often less tolerant. Protestants are not as committed to celibacy, while often not regarding marriage as a sacrament and permitting divorce. “But Protestants were more shocked than Catholics by fornication, and altogether more rigid in their moral condemnations [p. 56].” Protestant sinners are worse off than Catholic sinners, lacking the institutions of confession and absolution.
Those educated in the Christian tradition (i.e., most of us), have a hard time viewing these matters neutrally, without prejudices inculcated by an intensive childhood exposure to religious teachings. What is really wrong with sex? The Church’s negative attitude “must be regarded as purely superstitious… [p. 57],” the product of “a diseased condition of body or mind, or both [pp. 57-58].”
“The fact that an opinion has been widely held is no evidence whatever that it is not utterly absurd; indeed in view of the silliness of the majority of mankind, a widespread belief is more likely to be foolish than sensible. The Pelew Islanders believe that the perforation of the nose is necessary for winning eternal bliss. Europeans think that this end is better attained by wetting the head while pronouncing certain words. The belief of the Pelew Islanders is a superstition; the belief of Europeans one of the truths of our holy religion [page 58, footnote omitted].”
Jeremy Bentham noted that concepts had different names, depending on whether the writer was hoping to praise, dispraise, or be neutral towards the concept. It would be best to avoid words like “fornication” and “adultery” that carry a negative connotation, as well as “gallantry,” which signals approval. But neutral terms – ‘extra-marital sexual relations [p. 59]’ – undermine graceful writing; nevertheless, they must be the dominant, though not exclusive, means of discourse on these matters. (On page 60, Russell notes the personal double standard, that what I do is “gallantry” and what you do is “fornication.” Recall also Byron's Don Juan: "What men call gallantry, and gods adultery,/ Is much more common where the climate 's sultry.")
“The Christian ethics inevitably, through the emphasis laid upon sexual virtue, did a great deal to degrade the position of women [p. 60].” Men did the writing, and women were temptresses. The temptresses had to have their opportunities to tempt restricted. “It is only in quite modern times that women have regained the degree of freedom which they enjoyed in the Roman Empire [pp. 60-61].” Their freedom was “curtailed under the pretence of protecting them from sin [p. 61].” Now that the notion of sin is crumbling, female freedom is increasing.
Thursday, September 13, 2007
Marriage and Morals, Chapter 4
Chapter 4 (pages 33-43): “Phallic Worship, Asceticism and Sin”
Fertility of crops, herds, and women have long been of foremost importance, so in these realms “[r]eligion and magic were invoked to make sure of the desired result [p. 33].” In ancient Egypt and elsewhere, sex and religion focused on the female genitalia, but “in most ancient civilizations, the sexual element in religion took the form of phallic worship [p. 34].” Russell here and later in the chapter relies upon and quotes “Sex in Civilization,” by Robert Briffault. The quote on pages 34 and 35 notes the sexual license and phallic symbolism accompanying agricultural festivals, recognizing a link between the fertility of the fields and of women. Russell next provides an aside on sun versus moon worshiping, and he speculates that the ultimate victory of sun worship, where it took place, “was due to the patent fact that the sun has more influence than the moon over the crops [p. 36].”
Vestiges of phallic worship survived through the Middle Ages, even within Christianity – there were ithyphallic saints, as Russell notes (page 36) in a quote from Briffault. Protestantism eliminated these vestiges, however.
“Sacred prostitution is another institution which was very widespread in antiquity [p. 37],” and it probably arose from enlisting religion into promoting the fertility of women or crops.
But religions have anti-sexual elements, too, which won out wherever Christianity or Buddhism took hold. Asceticism and stoicism more than held their own with Epicureanism. It seems that “in certain circumstances men are led spontaneously to a horror of sex, and this when it arises is quite as much a natural impulse as the more usual attraction towards sex [pp. 38-39].”
Russell attributes anti-sexual attitudes to jealousy and sexual fatigue. When jealously is present, sex appears “disgusting, and the appetite which leads to it seems loathsome [p. 39].” [Somehow these passages made me think of modern Islamic fundamentalists – RBR] Instinctually, a man would prefer that all women love him and only him, so that love given to other men is morally condemned. Russell claims that the ideal wife in Shakespeare is a woman who doesn’t enjoy sex, but partakes in it with her husband from a sense of duty. The betrayed or impotent husband will be disgusted by sex.
Sexual fatigue is unknown in the animal kingdom and probably rare among the uncivilized. The lack of novelty makes it unlikely to occur in a monogamous marriage, too. The need for courtship slows things down enough to render sexual fatigue rare, too. But courtship is not necessary if women are not free to say no, and this is the case with married women and prostitutes, who “alike make their living by means of their sexual charms…[p. 41]” [Russell seems to contradict himself within a few lines here, when he says that monogamous marriages do not promote sexual fatigue, but shortly thereafter says that wives, like prostitutes, are not free to say no to sex. He seems to want to say (I am speculating based on the context) that sexual fatigue would be unlikely in a pure form of monogamy, but that economic pressures lead to a sort of corrupt monogamy where wives cannot say no. Nevertheless, I am not convinced by my own interpretation, as it is rare for Russell’s writing to lack clarity.] Unrestricted access to sex can lead men to engage to excess, at which point fatigue, disgust, and asceticism breed.
When jealousy and fatigue are both present, as in licentious societies, the anti-sex viewpoint will grow strong (p. 41). Further, priests and priestesses may be regarded as “married” to some divine, making them unfit for sex with mortals, and cementing a view that celibacy and holiness are paired.
Other factors probably encourage the anti-sex viewpoint. Some ages seem happy, and some depressed – it is hard to know why. When people are weary, the ascetic ideal takes hold, and it was in a weary age when the Christian ethic was formulated.
Fertility of crops, herds, and women have long been of foremost importance, so in these realms “[r]eligion and magic were invoked to make sure of the desired result [p. 33].” In ancient Egypt and elsewhere, sex and religion focused on the female genitalia, but “in most ancient civilizations, the sexual element in religion took the form of phallic worship [p. 34].” Russell here and later in the chapter relies upon and quotes “Sex in Civilization,” by Robert Briffault. The quote on pages 34 and 35 notes the sexual license and phallic symbolism accompanying agricultural festivals, recognizing a link between the fertility of the fields and of women. Russell next provides an aside on sun versus moon worshiping, and he speculates that the ultimate victory of sun worship, where it took place, “was due to the patent fact that the sun has more influence than the moon over the crops [p. 36].”
Vestiges of phallic worship survived through the Middle Ages, even within Christianity – there were ithyphallic saints, as Russell notes (page 36) in a quote from Briffault. Protestantism eliminated these vestiges, however.
“Sacred prostitution is another institution which was very widespread in antiquity [p. 37],” and it probably arose from enlisting religion into promoting the fertility of women or crops.
But religions have anti-sexual elements, too, which won out wherever Christianity or Buddhism took hold. Asceticism and stoicism more than held their own with Epicureanism. It seems that “in certain circumstances men are led spontaneously to a horror of sex, and this when it arises is quite as much a natural impulse as the more usual attraction towards sex [pp. 38-39].”
Russell attributes anti-sexual attitudes to jealousy and sexual fatigue. When jealously is present, sex appears “disgusting, and the appetite which leads to it seems loathsome [p. 39].” [Somehow these passages made me think of modern Islamic fundamentalists – RBR] Instinctually, a man would prefer that all women love him and only him, so that love given to other men is morally condemned. Russell claims that the ideal wife in Shakespeare is a woman who doesn’t enjoy sex, but partakes in it with her husband from a sense of duty. The betrayed or impotent husband will be disgusted by sex.
Sexual fatigue is unknown in the animal kingdom and probably rare among the uncivilized. The lack of novelty makes it unlikely to occur in a monogamous marriage, too. The need for courtship slows things down enough to render sexual fatigue rare, too. But courtship is not necessary if women are not free to say no, and this is the case with married women and prostitutes, who “alike make their living by means of their sexual charms…[p. 41]” [Russell seems to contradict himself within a few lines here, when he says that monogamous marriages do not promote sexual fatigue, but shortly thereafter says that wives, like prostitutes, are not free to say no to sex. He seems to want to say (I am speculating based on the context) that sexual fatigue would be unlikely in a pure form of monogamy, but that economic pressures lead to a sort of corrupt monogamy where wives cannot say no. Nevertheless, I am not convinced by my own interpretation, as it is rare for Russell’s writing to lack clarity.] Unrestricted access to sex can lead men to engage to excess, at which point fatigue, disgust, and asceticism breed.
When jealousy and fatigue are both present, as in licentious societies, the anti-sex viewpoint will grow strong (p. 41). Further, priests and priestesses may be regarded as “married” to some divine, making them unfit for sex with mortals, and cementing a view that celibacy and holiness are paired.
Other factors probably encourage the anti-sex viewpoint. Some ages seem happy, and some depressed – it is hard to know why. When people are weary, the ascetic ideal takes hold, and it was in a weary age when the Christian ethic was formulated.
Wednesday, September 12, 2007
Marriage and Morals, Chapter 3
Chapter 3 (pages 25-32): “The Dominion of the Father”
Once paternity is understood, “the love of power and the desire to survive death [p. 25]” supplement paternal feeling. Ambition encompasses the achievements of descendants. “In a matrilineal society family ambition would have to be confined to women, and as women do not do the fighting, such family ambition as they may have has less effect than that of men [p. 25].” So it is likely that the discovery of paternity increases competition and commotion; it also increases interest in the sexual virtue of wives.
Indeed, the instinctual component of male jealousy is commonly overrated. Male jealousy is strong in patriarchal societies because of “the fear of the falsification of descent [p. 26].” Even a man who cares more for his mistress than for his wife will be more jealous if a rival emerges for the affections of his wife than of his mistress. A father’s affection for his child “is a form of egotism [p. 26].”
The “discovery of fatherhood led to the subjection of women as the only means of securing their virtue… [p. 26]” – a subjection that initially was physical but became mental. “Owing to the subjection of women there has in most civilized communities been no genuine companionship between husbands and wives; their relation has been one of condescension on the one side and duty on the other [pp. 26-27]. [I am surprised here that Russell does not cite his godfather, John Stuart Mill, who noted the same fact in his essay “The Subjection of Women.” – RBR] No wonder Plato’s dialogues suggest that the male thinkers of Athens did not consider women to be “proper objects of serious love [p. 27]” – all the issues that the men cared about were not available to the contemplation of respectable women. “Love as a relation between men and women was ruined by the desire to make sure of the legitimacy of children. And not only love, but the whole contribution that women can make to civilization, has been stunted for the same reason [p. 27].”
The movement to a patrilineal society alters the economic system, as men inherit from their fathers and not their maternal uncles. This provides a closer-knit family, as property, authority and affection all are vested in the father. Patriarchy also brings about the interest men have in the virginity of their brides, because “it became of great importance to persuade women that all intercourse outside marriage is wicked [p. 28].”
Fathers tried to exploit fatherhood, and history is mainly about “the gradual decay of paternal power [p. 29],” as is suggested by ancestor worship. Fathers throughout history were vested with enormous powers over their families, and women were denied any period of independence, being subjected first to their father and then to their husband. Old women (somehow) acquired “almost despotic power within the household [p. 29],” especially over their daughter-in-laws.
Fathers originally acquire power in the household through superior strength but this is “reinforced by religion, which may in most of its forms be defined as the belief that the gods are on the side of the Government [p. 30].” Paternal power is reflected throughout society – even “the religious ideas of Christianity… are impregnated with the majesty of fatherhood [p. 30].” But as economic conditions changed, the admonition to multiply no longer matched self-interest. In Rome, upper-class women achieved near-equality with men – and ancient civilization was confined to a small percentage of the population, allowing it “to succumb to a great uprush of superstition from below. Christianity and the barbarian invasion destroyed the Greco-Roman system of ideas [p. 31].” Patriarchy remained, but had to align itself with Christian views on sex and individualism. The Christian doctrine of the immortality of the soul lessened the interest men had in the success of their descendants, which previously had been their only route to a form of immortality.
Modern societies remain patrilineal, but the importance of patrimony and family is significantly diminished. Ambition resides in hope for a high position, not in a large number of offspring, so “traditional morals and theology have less force than they used to have [p. 32].”
Once paternity is understood, “the love of power and the desire to survive death [p. 25]” supplement paternal feeling. Ambition encompasses the achievements of descendants. “In a matrilineal society family ambition would have to be confined to women, and as women do not do the fighting, such family ambition as they may have has less effect than that of men [p. 25].” So it is likely that the discovery of paternity increases competition and commotion; it also increases interest in the sexual virtue of wives.
Indeed, the instinctual component of male jealousy is commonly overrated. Male jealousy is strong in patriarchal societies because of “the fear of the falsification of descent [p. 26].” Even a man who cares more for his mistress than for his wife will be more jealous if a rival emerges for the affections of his wife than of his mistress. A father’s affection for his child “is a form of egotism [p. 26].”
The “discovery of fatherhood led to the subjection of women as the only means of securing their virtue… [p. 26]” – a subjection that initially was physical but became mental. “Owing to the subjection of women there has in most civilized communities been no genuine companionship between husbands and wives; their relation has been one of condescension on the one side and duty on the other [pp. 26-27]. [I am surprised here that Russell does not cite his godfather, John Stuart Mill, who noted the same fact in his essay “The Subjection of Women.” – RBR] No wonder Plato’s dialogues suggest that the male thinkers of Athens did not consider women to be “proper objects of serious love [p. 27]” – all the issues that the men cared about were not available to the contemplation of respectable women. “Love as a relation between men and women was ruined by the desire to make sure of the legitimacy of children. And not only love, but the whole contribution that women can make to civilization, has been stunted for the same reason [p. 27].”
The movement to a patrilineal society alters the economic system, as men inherit from their fathers and not their maternal uncles. This provides a closer-knit family, as property, authority and affection all are vested in the father. Patriarchy also brings about the interest men have in the virginity of their brides, because “it became of great importance to persuade women that all intercourse outside marriage is wicked [p. 28].”
Fathers tried to exploit fatherhood, and history is mainly about “the gradual decay of paternal power [p. 29],” as is suggested by ancestor worship. Fathers throughout history were vested with enormous powers over their families, and women were denied any period of independence, being subjected first to their father and then to their husband. Old women (somehow) acquired “almost despotic power within the household [p. 29],” especially over their daughter-in-laws.
Fathers originally acquire power in the household through superior strength but this is “reinforced by religion, which may in most of its forms be defined as the belief that the gods are on the side of the Government [p. 30].” Paternal power is reflected throughout society – even “the religious ideas of Christianity… are impregnated with the majesty of fatherhood [p. 30].” But as economic conditions changed, the admonition to multiply no longer matched self-interest. In Rome, upper-class women achieved near-equality with men – and ancient civilization was confined to a small percentage of the population, allowing it “to succumb to a great uprush of superstition from below. Christianity and the barbarian invasion destroyed the Greco-Roman system of ideas [p. 31].” Patriarchy remained, but had to align itself with Christian views on sex and individualism. The Christian doctrine of the immortality of the soul lessened the interest men had in the success of their descendants, which previously had been their only route to a form of immortality.
Modern societies remain patrilineal, but the importance of patrimony and family is significantly diminished. Ambition resides in hope for a high position, not in a large number of offspring, so “traditional morals and theology have less force than they used to have [p. 32].”
Tuesday, September 11, 2007
Marriage and Morals, Chapter 2
Chapter 2 (pages 14-24): “Where Fatherhood is Unknown”
Three intertwined, overlapping factors, the instinctive, economic, and religious, compose marriage customs. Religion can give a preference among various instinctual possibilities: “for example, love and jealousy are both instinctive emotions, but religion has decreed that jealousy is a virtuous emotion to which the community ought to lend support, while love is at best excusable [pp. 14-15].” [I would have thought that Russell’s example would have gone the other way, though I think I can discern his reasoning. Has this situation changed since 1929? – RBR]
The instinctive component in sex is typically overrated; practices seemingly contrary to instinct, such as the deflowering of virgins by priests, have been widespread and hardy. (This custom would seem contrary to the instincts of Christian bridegrooms.) The loan of wives to guests, polyandry, and infanticide are other examples. “The only act in this whole [sexual -- RBR] realm which can be called instinctive in the strict psychological sense is the act of sucking in infancy [p. 16].” Russell (page 16) cites Havelock Ellis for the contention that civilized people have to learn the sexual act, and claims that doctors are often asked by married couples, ignorant of sex, for advice on how to have children. For humans, there is a sort of dissatisfaction that almost accidentally finds alleviation, and hence the act of alleviation is repeated. “What is instinctive is thus not so much the finished activity as the impulse to learn it…[p. 17]” Russell claims that among the activities that bring satisfaction, the “biologically most advantageous” one will “give the most complete satisfaction, provided it is learnt before contrary habits have been acquired [p. 17].”
How have natural impulses led to the patriarchal family and the corresponding emphasis on female virtue? After all, fathers aren’t even sure that a child is their own. But paternal sentiments need not be directed to one’s own children. Here, Russell relies upon Malinowski’s work on the Trobriand Islanders, which he claims puts beyond dispute the notion that the islanders do not know that people (or other animals) have fathers. For instance, an islander husband who has been away for more than a year is delighted when he returns to find that his wife has recently given birth. Unsurprisingly, “descent is traced solely through the female line [p. 20],” and the more typical fatherly authority is exercised by maternal uncles. (I understand, incidentally, that this is still the case in that region of the world – RBR.) The incest taboo is so strong among the islanders, however, that those maternal uncles are not often in the company of their adult sisters, producing an “admirable system” (page 21) where children get affection but not discipline from their fathers, while those who have the right to discipline, the uncles, are not on the scene.
As a patriarchal religion, Christianity is a hard sell among peoples who do not recognize paternity.
A father who is with his wife during pregnancy and birth will instinctively be fond of the child – but if the father is not around, his initial devotion to his child is less instinctual. But “[i]n all the important human relations socially desirable acts, towards which there is an instinct not strong enough to be always compelling, are enforced by social ethics…[p. 23].” Russell believes that there is a tendency in both men and women to feel affection for any child whom the adult must look after; this tendency will be reinforced in husband/fathers by the affection that they feel for the child’s mother.
According to Malinowski, all of mankind must have “passed through the stage” that the Trobriand Islanders (and non-human animals) are in, that of not recognizing paternity. Our familiar “sentiment of paternity” can only arise once the fact of paternity is understood.
Three intertwined, overlapping factors, the instinctive, economic, and religious, compose marriage customs. Religion can give a preference among various instinctual possibilities: “for example, love and jealousy are both instinctive emotions, but religion has decreed that jealousy is a virtuous emotion to which the community ought to lend support, while love is at best excusable [pp. 14-15].” [I would have thought that Russell’s example would have gone the other way, though I think I can discern his reasoning. Has this situation changed since 1929? – RBR]
The instinctive component in sex is typically overrated; practices seemingly contrary to instinct, such as the deflowering of virgins by priests, have been widespread and hardy. (This custom would seem contrary to the instincts of Christian bridegrooms.) The loan of wives to guests, polyandry, and infanticide are other examples. “The only act in this whole [sexual -- RBR] realm which can be called instinctive in the strict psychological sense is the act of sucking in infancy [p. 16].” Russell (page 16) cites Havelock Ellis for the contention that civilized people have to learn the sexual act, and claims that doctors are often asked by married couples, ignorant of sex, for advice on how to have children. For humans, there is a sort of dissatisfaction that almost accidentally finds alleviation, and hence the act of alleviation is repeated. “What is instinctive is thus not so much the finished activity as the impulse to learn it…[p. 17]” Russell claims that among the activities that bring satisfaction, the “biologically most advantageous” one will “give the most complete satisfaction, provided it is learnt before contrary habits have been acquired [p. 17].”
How have natural impulses led to the patriarchal family and the corresponding emphasis on female virtue? After all, fathers aren’t even sure that a child is their own. But paternal sentiments need not be directed to one’s own children. Here, Russell relies upon Malinowski’s work on the Trobriand Islanders, which he claims puts beyond dispute the notion that the islanders do not know that people (or other animals) have fathers. For instance, an islander husband who has been away for more than a year is delighted when he returns to find that his wife has recently given birth. Unsurprisingly, “descent is traced solely through the female line [p. 20],” and the more typical fatherly authority is exercised by maternal uncles. (I understand, incidentally, that this is still the case in that region of the world – RBR.) The incest taboo is so strong among the islanders, however, that those maternal uncles are not often in the company of their adult sisters, producing an “admirable system” (page 21) where children get affection but not discipline from their fathers, while those who have the right to discipline, the uncles, are not on the scene.
As a patriarchal religion, Christianity is a hard sell among peoples who do not recognize paternity.
A father who is with his wife during pregnancy and birth will instinctively be fond of the child – but if the father is not around, his initial devotion to his child is less instinctual. But “[i]n all the important human relations socially desirable acts, towards which there is an instinct not strong enough to be always compelling, are enforced by social ethics…[p. 23].” Russell believes that there is a tendency in both men and women to feel affection for any child whom the adult must look after; this tendency will be reinforced in husband/fathers by the affection that they feel for the child’s mother.
According to Malinowski, all of mankind must have “passed through the stage” that the Trobriand Islanders (and non-human animals) are in, that of not recognizing paternity. Our familiar “sentiment of paternity” can only arise once the fact of paternity is understood.
Monday, September 10, 2007
Marriage and Morals, Chapter 1
I am using the sixth printing of the first edition, published by Horace Liveright in New York, 1929 (sixth printing April, 1930).
Chapter 1 (of 21), pages 3-13: “Why a Sexual Ethic is Necessary”
The economic system and the family system are two interconnected elements that characterize societies. Marx focuses on the economic system, and Freud on the family system. But Russell does not accept the primacy of one system over the other; for instance, the industrial revolution influenced sexual morality, but was in part caused by the prevailing sexual morality. The (economic) desire for food is motivated to a large extent by family concerns, as is the demand for life insurance. Private property and the family also are intertwined.
Sexual morals come in “several layers [p. 4],” including legal institutions (monogamy or polygamy), a non-legal layer where public opinion dominates, and “a layer which is left to individual discretion, in practice if not in theory [p. 5]”. Throughout human history, only in Soviet Russia (!) have sexual ethics and institutions “been determined by rational considerations [p. 5]” – this isn't to say that the Soviet institutions are desirable, only that they are not the result of “superstition and tradition [p. 5].” The optimal sexual morality in terms of human happiness will vary over place and time, with the economic system and the death rate, for instance.
Sexual ethics produce effects at many levels, too, from the personal to the international, and desirable effects at one level might be matched by undesirable effects at another level. Understanding the personal effects, those considered by psychoanalysis, requires an examination both of adult behavior and of the education of children aimed to produce adherence to the prevailing norm.
One level above the personal is the relationship between men and women. It is accepted that the greater the extent of a psychic or loving component, the more value there is to physical relations. Whether love has more value as it becomes more intense is debatable, however (p. 7). Equality of sexual relations has become valued in modern times, reducing the attractiveness of polygamy. When evaluating conjugal relations, both marital and the corresponding non-marital relationships must be considered.
At the family level, the “monogamic patriarchal family [p. 7]” is becoming predominant. “The primary motive of sexual ethics as they have existed in Western civilization since pre-Christian times has been to secure that degree of female virtue without which the patriarchal family becomes impossible, since paternity is uncertain [pp. 7-8].” [Of course, DNA testing can now remove the uncertainty of paternity -- RBR.] Christianity and modernity have supplemented this requisite female virtue with an asceticism-motivated male virtue and female jealousy in part produced by the emancipation of women. But female jealousy is probably a temporary stage, as eventually the equality of females will lead them to prefer equal freedoms for, and not equal restrictions on, the sexes.
Monogamous family relations vary along such dimensions as who chooses the marriage partners, whether a bride or groom price is paid, and the ease of divorce. For some animals (like birds), male cooperation in gestating or raising the young is necessary for survival. In humans, traditionally “the cooperation of the father is a great biological advantage to the offspring [p. 9],” but as the welfare state expands, fathers become less important to the success of offspring. If fathers really do become more-or-less useless, “we must expect a complete breakdown of traditional morality, since there will no longer be any reason why a mother should wish the paternity of her child to be indubitable [p. 9].” Russell won’t go to the Platonic extreme of also replacing the mother with the state, because he is not a big admirer of government and is unimpressed with the qualities of orphanages; but perhaps economic forces will push society in that direction.
Law enforces a society’s sexual ethic, and also tries “to protect the ordinary rights of individuals in the sphere of sex [p. 10],” which amounts (primarily) to protecting women and children from sexual assault or exploitation and combatting sexually-transmitted diseases. But the law doesn’t do a very good job. The moral panic of the White Slave Traffic, for instance, resulted in laws that pose little barrier to criminals but provide opportunities to blackmail “harmless people [p. 10].” The attitude that acquiring an STD is a just desert for sin “prevents the adoption of the measures which would be the most effective on purely medical grounds... [p. 10],” while the moral condemnation of STDs also causes them to be concealed.
Population issues arise along various dimensions, including the international and the eugenic. There is no reason to believe that a system that is privately optimal also is socially optimal. Typically, the systems that are adopted are unjustifiably cruel. “[A]dvances in medicine and hygiene have made changes in sexual ethics desirable both from a private and from a public point of view [p. 12],” while fathers are also becoming less relevant as the state’s role in education increases. So currently we have to overcome superstition, while also seeing how new conditions have altered desirable institutions. But first, a look at some past and present systems...
Chapter 1 (of 21), pages 3-13: “Why a Sexual Ethic is Necessary”
The economic system and the family system are two interconnected elements that characterize societies. Marx focuses on the economic system, and Freud on the family system. But Russell does not accept the primacy of one system over the other; for instance, the industrial revolution influenced sexual morality, but was in part caused by the prevailing sexual morality. The (economic) desire for food is motivated to a large extent by family concerns, as is the demand for life insurance. Private property and the family also are intertwined.
Sexual morals come in “several layers [p. 4],” including legal institutions (monogamy or polygamy), a non-legal layer where public opinion dominates, and “a layer which is left to individual discretion, in practice if not in theory [p. 5]”. Throughout human history, only in Soviet Russia (!) have sexual ethics and institutions “been determined by rational considerations [p. 5]” – this isn't to say that the Soviet institutions are desirable, only that they are not the result of “superstition and tradition [p. 5].” The optimal sexual morality in terms of human happiness will vary over place and time, with the economic system and the death rate, for instance.
Sexual ethics produce effects at many levels, too, from the personal to the international, and desirable effects at one level might be matched by undesirable effects at another level. Understanding the personal effects, those considered by psychoanalysis, requires an examination both of adult behavior and of the education of children aimed to produce adherence to the prevailing norm.
One level above the personal is the relationship between men and women. It is accepted that the greater the extent of a psychic or loving component, the more value there is to physical relations. Whether love has more value as it becomes more intense is debatable, however (p. 7). Equality of sexual relations has become valued in modern times, reducing the attractiveness of polygamy. When evaluating conjugal relations, both marital and the corresponding non-marital relationships must be considered.
At the family level, the “monogamic patriarchal family [p. 7]” is becoming predominant. “The primary motive of sexual ethics as they have existed in Western civilization since pre-Christian times has been to secure that degree of female virtue without which the patriarchal family becomes impossible, since paternity is uncertain [pp. 7-8].” [Of course, DNA testing can now remove the uncertainty of paternity -- RBR.] Christianity and modernity have supplemented this requisite female virtue with an asceticism-motivated male virtue and female jealousy in part produced by the emancipation of women. But female jealousy is probably a temporary stage, as eventually the equality of females will lead them to prefer equal freedoms for, and not equal restrictions on, the sexes.
Monogamous family relations vary along such dimensions as who chooses the marriage partners, whether a bride or groom price is paid, and the ease of divorce. For some animals (like birds), male cooperation in gestating or raising the young is necessary for survival. In humans, traditionally “the cooperation of the father is a great biological advantage to the offspring [p. 9],” but as the welfare state expands, fathers become less important to the success of offspring. If fathers really do become more-or-less useless, “we must expect a complete breakdown of traditional morality, since there will no longer be any reason why a mother should wish the paternity of her child to be indubitable [p. 9].” Russell won’t go to the Platonic extreme of also replacing the mother with the state, because he is not a big admirer of government and is unimpressed with the qualities of orphanages; but perhaps economic forces will push society in that direction.
Law enforces a society’s sexual ethic, and also tries “to protect the ordinary rights of individuals in the sphere of sex [p. 10],” which amounts (primarily) to protecting women and children from sexual assault or exploitation and combatting sexually-transmitted diseases. But the law doesn’t do a very good job. The moral panic of the White Slave Traffic, for instance, resulted in laws that pose little barrier to criminals but provide opportunities to blackmail “harmless people [p. 10].” The attitude that acquiring an STD is a just desert for sin “prevents the adoption of the measures which would be the most effective on purely medical grounds... [p. 10],” while the moral condemnation of STDs also causes them to be concealed.
Population issues arise along various dimensions, including the international and the eugenic. There is no reason to believe that a system that is privately optimal also is socially optimal. Typically, the systems that are adopted are unjustifiably cruel. “[A]dvances in medicine and hygiene have made changes in sexual ethics desirable both from a private and from a public point of view [p. 12],” while fathers are also becoming less relevant as the state’s role in education increases. So currently we have to overcome superstition, while also seeing how new conditions have altered desirable institutions. But first, a look at some past and present systems...
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